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ABSTRACT
The goal of this thesis is to achieve covert communication, i.e. to covertly
relay information using resources that are traditionally unintended for data
transmission. In a covert channel, only the sender and receiver are aware of
the communication and capable of reading the transmitted message, and any
other party would not be aware of the existence of this transmission. The
timing channel has been studied as a medium for covert communication in
a computer network. It offers the means to communicate a message by re-
laying information encrypted within the timings formed between consecutive
packets.
This thesis covers two schemes that utilize the timing channel for covert
communication – to send a message and to trace network flows. The former,
is the design of the first spyware circuit that covertly leaks spied informa-
tion using an efficient encoder and for a network employing the CSMA/CA.
This protocol modifies the inter-packet delays of the network flow using an
exponential back-off rule. The second scheme does not relay any message
but adds a signature called a watermark to enable flow tracing through the
network with dependent deletion and substitution errors, and unlike earlier
schemes, it is capable of withstanding desynchronization caused by packet
drops. We will verify that our schemes are detectable by the receiver, and
robust to the noise introduced by the network. In addition to their reliability,
they are both difficult to detect and remain invisible to an observer.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Covert Communication
The aim of this thesis is to present methods to achieve covert communica-
tion. Covert communication means disclosing unauthorized information or
relaying a message, especially by using resources that are not intended for
the purpose of communication [1]. In a covert channel, only the intended
parties are aware of the communication and are capable of reliably decoding
the hidden data. Any unintended parties should not be able to recover the
transferred data, and, even better, should be unaware of the existence of
this communication. The analysis of covert communication has attracted a
large amount of interest, such as in military communication. It is also means
to thwart attacks made by malicious hackers who could use these covert
channels to attack systems and organizations to leak personal and secured
information. Computer hackers sometimes launch attacks on organizations
by using ‘stepping stones’, i.e. redirecting their traffic, by using the systems
of unaware network users, in order to hide the source of the attack. In this
case, covertly inserting a marker in the network flows would enable linking
these flows and thereby identifying flows belonging to the same chain. In
short, the study of covert communication is important for security, not only
for big businesses, but also for the individual user.
Communication over a network involves sending a series of packets from
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one host system to another, where each packet consists of some part of the
message. One method used to ensure that only the intended parties are able
to decode the message from these packets, is to encrypt the information itself.
The content of the packets could require some form of decoding to read the
data and the overall message. Yet if the goal is not only encryption, but also
to hide the presence of the communication, then communicating packets that
are obviously encrypted will not suffice.
Covert communication uses system resources that are not intended for
communication for the purpose of relaying information. Security analysts
categorize covert channels into two forms [2]:
• Storage channels which involve reading and writing from a storage lo-
cation.
• Timing channels which use system resources such as CPU times for the
sending and receiving processes to communicate with each other.
The second item, the timing channel, is the means of covert communication
that is the subject of this thesis. In a network, a system resource that can
potentially be used to relay information is the time between packets. Any
message a user sends via the Internet is broken into packets that are efficiently
handled by the network. In each of these network flows, there are spaces
between the packets – each packet has a small amount of space between
itself and the next packet. These spaces are referred to as inter-packet delays
(IPDs) or inter-arrival times, defined as the time between two consecutive
packets. These IPDs always exist in any network flow, and though they are
not intended for communication, research in the past few years has looked
at encoding messages within these IPDs. A simple case of encoding a binary
message would be to map an even inter-packet delay to a bit ‘0’ and an odd
2
inter-packet delay to a bit ‘1’.
Using IPDs between packets has many advantages. It offers a new degree
of freedom to encode a message that is independent of the size of the packets
and present in every network flow. It is also a resource that is not intended or
considered for communication. As long as there are not any adverse changes
to the IPDs, the network traffic and its packets remain unaffected. Inter-
packet delays thus provide an excellent method to hide a message, as long as
there is not much difference between the IPDs of a normal network flow and
IPDs of flows with a hidden message. However, there are some challenges
with using IPDs to communicate a message – the IPDs within a network
flow are always perturbed by the network. Each network flow goes through
various devices (routers, switches, etc.) which modify or perturb the IPDs;
therefore, the packet timings, at the receiver’s end, are no longer the same as
the original timings when encoding the message. These devices that change
the IPDs of the network flow are modeled as a queuing channel since it
processes each packet in the order of arrival.
This thesis will look into methods of relaying information covertly via the
timing channel. The goal is to relay some data from one system to another
using the timing channel in a network. Chapter 4 explains a scheme that
sends data encoded within the IPDs to create a spyware for a network that
employs the commonly used CSMA/CA protocol (Carrier Sense Multiple Ac-
cess with Collision Avoidance), which as its name implies, attempts to avoid
collisions between various flows by using exponential back-offs. Chapter 5
describes the addition of a signature, called a watermark, to each flow that
will help trace it through the network. The noise added to the timing channel
is created by a network that has Laplacian jitters, and randomly drops pack-
ets. The following sections of this introduction will further describe these
3
chapters.
1.2 Outline and Motivation
Chapter 2 provides a survey on the research in the past few years on tim-
ing channels. Some researchers have analyzed the timing channel and others
have provided schemes that utilize it. The chapter then explains the research
in flow tracing and detecting stepping stones, including tracing flows by em-
bedding a watermark in the timing channel. This chapter will also list some
of the detection techniques that are capable of detecting the presence of the
covert timing channel.
Chapter 3 offers a detailed explanation on some of the algorithms and tech-
niques used in the research covered in later chapters. It starts by describing
the timing channel model, and the model for the network and its essential
characteristics. It also describes a technique that encodes a message within
the IPDs of the network flow. Later it lists the detection techniques that will
be used to test the visibility of the schemes proposed in Chapter 4 and 5. It
concludes by giving a short explanation on some of the concepts used in the
later chapters, such as the low-density parity-check codes, the sum-product
decoding algorithm and the CSMA/CA protocol.
The following subsections will describe the motivation behind the subjects
covered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
1.2.1 Timing Channel Spyware for CSMA/CA Protocol
Advances in technologies have lead to the increasing importance of data
security and privacy. It is essential that security vulnerabilities of systems are
studied and analyzed to prevent the leakage of vital or personal information.
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Chapter 4 will discuss a new covert communication that leaks secured
and private chip data using the timing channel. It utilizes a coding scheme
which embeds the data within the IPDs between consecutive packets. The
network noise is modeled by a ·/M/1 queuing channel, which adds random
independent, identically distributed (i.i.d) exponential or geometric values to
the IPDs of the original flow. It uses sparse-graph linear codes followed by
a shaping technique to transform uniformly distributed random variables to
one with the required distribution.
The noise that perturbs the IPDs is introduced by the IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA
protocol. This protocol is a carrier sensing scheme where a node attempts to
avoid collision by first sensing if the channel is available. In case the channel
is busy, the node inserts an exponential back-off. This chapter will discuss the
first reliable covert communication system, based on timing channels, capa-
ble of being robust to perturbations introduced by the CSMA/CA’s back-off
rule.
Section 4.1 will introduce the topic and state the goals and contributions
and Section 2.4 will survey literature on malicious hardware and their de-
tection. The scheme proposed in Chapter 4 will use the timing channel
explained in Section 3.1 and the coding scheme explained in Section 4.3. An
explanation of the CSMA/CA protocol is given in Section 3.6.
1.2.2 Watermarking
Watermarking is a technique used to trace packet flows as they pass through
the network either to find the source of an attack or to attack the anonymity
of a network flow. Watermarks exploit the timing channel by perturbing the
IPDs to embed some identifiable mark that is robust to any network effects
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(jitters, packet losses) but at the same time remains invisible to an outside
observer. Watermarks are divided into two types:
• Interval-based watermarks which perform transformations on an inter-
val and are robust to packet losses, but detectable using the multi-flow
attack [3].
• Inter-packet delay watermarks which modify each individual inter-packet
delay, but are vulnerable to packet losses since they lead to desynchro-
nization.
The research in the past few years is given in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Pre-
vious research has mainly focused on robustness against network jitters that
perturb the IPDs and disregarded the possibility of packet losses. In Chap-
ter 5 we will present a novel IPD-based watermarking scheme that is shown to
be robust to both network jitters and packet losses, while remaining invisible
to the detection techniques explained in Section 3.2.
1.3 Notation
For consistency we will be standardizing the following notations throughout
this thesis.
• Random variables will always be noted using italic upper case letters,
and values using italic lower case letters.
• A vector will be denoted by bold lower case letters, and matrices by
bold upper case letters.
• Sequences are represented by italic lower case letters with the length
as an exponent. For example, xn = {x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn} where n is its
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length. Each element of xn is denoted by xi given an index {i : i ∈
Z, 0 < i ≤ n}.
There is no difference between the representation of a vector x ∈ Rn and
{xn : xi ∈ R, i ∈ Z+}. The decision to represent a notation by either form
would depend on the context in which it is being used; for mathematical
equations, the vector representation is preferred.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1 Covert Timing Channels
Historically, timing channels are synonymous with covert channels [1, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9]. Lampson [1] studied the problem of preventing a program from
communicating with another program that has not called it and classified
the various possible leaks. His is one of the first papers that defines the
timing channel and categorizes covert communication. The Department of
Defense [4] published a paper that states that the evaluation of the reliability
and security of computer systems requires the analysis of timing channels.
Kang et al. [6] noticed that a covert channel is formed by the timings of ACKs
during the communication between a ‘High’ receiver and a ‘Low’ sender. This
channel could be used to send messages from ‘High’ to ‘Low’, i.e. the intended
receiver ‘High’ could send messages to the intended sender ‘Low’; therefore,
the communication is not in the permitted direction.
Timing channels have been studied to understand their characteristics [10,
5]. Anantharam et al. [10] studied the capacity of queuing channels where the
information is encoded within the IPDs of the packet flow and the receiver
sees a noisy version of the input. A single server queue with deterministic
service time has infinite capacity since the packets could be sent at a rate
greater than the service time. For non-deterministic service times, finding
the capacity is a challenge due to the channel being non-memoryless, non-
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stationary, and non-linear. They show that even with departures that are
a random transformation of the input to the channel, reliable decoding is
possible as long as the input flow rate is below capacity. Among these single-
server queues, the capacity is the lowest for those with exponential service
times and this capacity cannot be increased by feedback.
Bedekar et al. [11] studied the discrete case version of Anantharam et
al. [10] studied and solved for the capacity of discrete time single-server
queues where the service times are i.i.d integer values. They found that
among all queues with such a model, the queue with geometrically distributed
service times has the smallest capacity.
Sundaresan et al. [12] are among the first to find the existence of good tree
codes with sequential decoding for an exponential server timing channel.
They were able to improve on earlier decoding techniques and provided a
finite upper bound on the expected number of computations to move one
step ahead. However, the complexity was reduced at the expense of the rate,
and their scheme could only achieve rates half that of capacity.
Some research focuses on creating and designing practical network timing
channels. Padlipsky et al. [13] used an ON/OFF scheme to covertly com-
municate a message where a packet in a predetermined interval indicates a
bit ‘1’ which is otherwise a bit ‘0’. Cabuk et al. [14] provided an IP timing-
based design that uses a similar technique on the IP protocol using a special
starting sequence for synchronization. Luo [9] proposed a TCP-based tim-
ing channel against network jitters and packet losses by encoding a message
into TCP packet bursts and showed that their timing channel has a higher
decoding accuracy compared to the IP timing channel.
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2.2 Flow Tracing and Watermarks
The ability to trace a network flow as it travels through the network is es-
sential in preventing malicious users from masking the source of an attack or
impeding anonymous traffic. Staniford-Chen and Heberlein [15] proposed a
thumbprint that would embed a signature in the packet contents and com-
pared flows in different connections; but since most traffic is encrypted, the
contents are inaccessible. Recent works have shown that similarities in com-
munication patterns such as packet sizes and timings may be used for flow
linking [16, 17, 18, 19]. There are two methods to analyze traffic – active or
passive.
Passive analysis such as [15, 16, 20, 21] uses the original characteristics of
a packet flow. Zhang and Paxson [16] examined the ON/OFF periods, i.e.
the period of activity and inactivity of the traffic, by measuring the coinci-
dent transitions from the ON state to the OFF state. Yoda and Etoh [20]
detected flows that belong to the same chain by comparing the deviations
defined as the difference between the average propagation delay and the min-
imum propagation delay between two connections. Wang et al. [21] showed
that the IPDs are preserved over router hops and stepping stones, and, since
they are unique to the user, can be used as a basis for a correlation measure.
These schemes rely only on the original characteristics in the observed flows,
which can be easily weakened by timing perturbations during network trans-
missions. Therefore, successful detection using these schemes often requires
analysis of a large number of packets.
Active analysis schemes inject a signature or a pattern into the IPDs of
the flows. They are further divided into interval-based schemes and IPD-
based schemes. Pyun et al. [18] is a case of the former, where when a ‘0’
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is embedded, all packets in a selected interval are squeezed into the subse-
quent interval. Kiyavash et al. [3] showed that interval-based watermarking
schemes are vulnerable to the multi-flow attack whereupon observing a few
flows, the attacker can detect the watermark as an abnormally large num-
ber of empty time periods that were created during the embedding process.
In IPD-based schemes [17, 22, 19], watermark bits are embedded into the
inter-arrival times of packets. Wang and Reeves [17] first introduced using
watermarks within network flows. They suggested introducing small per-
turbation within the IPDs by using a quantization encoding scheme, where
each bit of the watermark is embedded into m > 1 packets. They demon-
strated that their scheme was robust to timing perturbations and proved
that they could theoretically achieve close-to-perfect detection rates for suf-
ficiently long flows. Later, Wang et al. [22] used IPD-based watermarks on
encrypted peer-to-peer Voice over IP, using several milliseconds of timing
perturbations to create unique flows. Wang et al. [23] also showed that low-
latency anonymous systems are not able to disguise the network flows against
sufficiently long watermarks in spite of various flow transformations such as
bogus packets, traffic padding, flow mixing and splitting, natural or inten-
tional jitter, or packet drops. Earlier schemes mainly dealt with robustness
against network jitters and did not consider the possibility of packet losses
that lead to desynchronization. Haumansadr et al. [19] extended their IPD-
based watermark to handle packet losses by performing selective correlation
where packets that did not have a corresponding match in the incoming flow
are removed. However, this scheme is non-blind, requiring the storage of the
incoming flow’s timings.
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2.3 Detecting the Timing Channel
The covert timing channel that either communicates a message or simply
traces the flow must be invisible to an outside observer, i.e. the observer
should not be aware of the use of the timing channel, or able to extract the
encoding parameters.
Earlier work has been mainly focused on disrupting or completely eliminat-
ing covert timing channels [24, 25]. Kang and Moskowitz [24, 26] moderated
the ACKs in order to decrease the capacity of the covert timing channel by
decoupling the ACKs sent from a ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and adding random noise.
Giles et al. [25] limited the capacity in a game between the sender and receiver
versus a jammer. More recent work has focused on the detection of covert
timing channels [14, 27]. Cabuk et al. [14] detected highly regular behavior
in the IPDs of a covert flow as a result of static encoding of frames, whereas
normal flows do not have any regular patterns. Berk et al. [27] noted that in
a binary covert channel, the mean IPD is in between two spikes, formed by a
histogram of the flow’s IPDs, compared to a normal flow which has one large
spike about the mean IPD. Gianvecchio et al. [28] provided a technique that
uses the entropy of the IPDs of network flow to indicate if the flow contains
information within its IPDs. Peng et al. [29] studied the visibility of water-
marks and the importance of careful design in order to prevent an attacker
from being able to detect and recover watermark parameters and therefore
remove the watermark or discard watermarked flows. They used the tech-
nique proposed by Wang et al. [17] and showed the attacker needs only to
have access to the time stamps of the packets. They noted that embedding
a watermark forms packet delays of either a uniform distribution or a combi-
nation of uniform and normal distributions. They were able successfully to
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employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [30, 31] that compares the statistical
distribitions of the IPDs to effectively distinguish between watermarked and
unwatermarked flows.
2.4 Malicious Hardware
Research in hardware malware has recently emerged, especially after the De-
partment of Defense’s Defense Science Board comprehensive report on the
subject in 2005 [32]. Much of this work has concentrated on detection of
foundry-inserted Trojans (malware), which is typically done by invasive or
noninvasive study of the post-silicon ICs and comparison with the original
design files to detect the modifications to the manufactured chips [33]. A
number of methods for protection of ICs and third-party IP cores against
piracy have been invented [34]. The threat of insertion of spyware in com-
munication and security hardware modules has been identified [35]. Recently,
King et al. [36] have designed and implemented malicious hardware that can
get hidden login access or can steal the security keys on a microprocessor.
The malicious hardware is embedded at the micro-architecture level by addi-
tion of a block of gates and does not modify the internals of the architectural
blocks.
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CHAPTER 3
PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Timing Channel
In a network, any communication is typically relayed in the packet contents
of a network flow, but the spaces or pauses between consecutive packets offer
another medium for communication. The timing channel for this scenario is
depicted in Figure 3.1. Consider two individuals – a sender and receiver who
wish to send a series of bits through a channel. Each bit is encoded within
the IPDs of successive packets. In between is a queuing channel, a channel
that introduces noise by distorting the original IPDs.
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Figure 3.1: The message m is encoded within the arrival times a1, . . . , an.
The ·/M/1 queue represents devices, such as routers, which introduce noise,
leading to the modification of the timings. This results in the departure
times d1, . . . , dn read by the decoder to produce the message mˆ.
The sender wishes to encode a message m within the IPDs of the input
flow with arrival times an = {a1, a2, . . . , an} where n is the total number of
14
packets and ai is the the time at which the packet i is generated. The packets
in the incoming flows arrive at an average rate of λ, therefore
E
[
n−1∑
i=1
(ai+1 − ai)
n
]
=
1
λ
The IPDs are defined as the times between two consecutive packets. For
the above case, the IPDs of the arrival flow an are given by
Iai , ai+1 − ai, i ∈ [1, n)
3.1.1 Exponential Server Timing Channel
The channel that distorts the IPDs of the original flow is modeled as a queu-
ing channel. Similar to the everyday ‘queue’, the queuing channel services
or processes each ‘customer’ (the packet) in the order of arrival. Since each
packet is processed, there is a service time added to the IPDs of each packet.
These increases or decreases in the inter-packet delays will be referred to as
service times. A queuing channel is defined by the rate of the arrival pro-
cess of its customers, the average number of customers that it serves and the
number of servers.
In this thesis, the queuing channel is modeled as a ·/M/1 queuing channel,
such as the exponential server timing channel (ESTC), which is the sim-
plest queuing channel. It is a first-come-first-served channel that can handle
Poisson-distributed arrivals of rate λ and processes each packet with inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d) exponential service times of rate
µ.
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3.1.2 Capacity
Using the timing channels to encode information offers an interesting sit-
uation to analyze and to find its properties. The ESTC queuing channel
is non-memoryless, non-stationary, and non-linear, and it is challenging to
find the capacity of such channels. Anantharam’s ‘Bits through Queues’ [10]
studied the capacity of queuing channels that coded information within tim-
ings.
For a single-server ·/M/1 queue with rate µ, the capacity given an arrival
process with average rate λ ∈ (0, µ) is given by [10]
C(µ, λ) = λ log2
µ
λ
(bits per second), λ < µ (3.1)
The capacity is obtained by maximizing C(µ, λ) over all possible λ < µ and
is given by
C(µ) = e−1µ log2 e (bits per second) (3.2)
where the optimal rate is a Poisson process with rate λ∗ = exp−1 µ. Since in
a period of T seconds there are an average of n = λT packets, we get
C˜(µ, λ) = log2
µ
λ
(bits per packet), λ < µ
C˜(µ) = log2 e (bits per packet)
(3.3)
Bedekar et al. [11] studied the discrete time single-server queues where the
service times are i.i.d integer values with mean 1/µ slots. The discrete time
analogue of the continuous time case as given by [11, 37] for rate λ ∈ [0, µ)
C(µ, λ) = H(λ)− λ
µ
H(µ) (bits per slot) (3.4)
16
where H(.) is a binary entropy function. The timing channel capacity ob-
tained by taking the supremum of all λ over the timing capacities for 0 ≤
λ < µ is
C(µ) = log2(1 + ν) (bits per slot)
ν , e−
H(µ)
µ
(3.5)
where the maximum is achieved by a Bernoulli process with rate
λ∗ =
ν
1 + ν
(3.6)
Similarly, for T slots there is an average of n = λT packets, therefore
is
C˜(µ, λ) =
H(λ)
λ
− H(µ)
µ
(bits per packet)
C˜(µ) = (1 +
1
ν
) log2(1 + ν) (bits per packet)
(3.7)
3.1.3 Service Times
We can map each departure packet di to its arrival packet ai as follows.
P (d|a) =

∏n
i=1 PSi(s) if di ≥ ai,
0 otherwise
(3.8)
where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} represents the service times of the queuing channel
and can be defined as
si , di −max(di−1, ai) (3.9)
The maximum term ensures that we consider that the queue might have to
process the previous packet before the next successive packet. For example,
the queue may take some time (s1) to process the first packet, but if the
17
second packet arrives before the first is processed, i.e. a2 < d2, then the
service time of the second packet is d2 − d1.
In continuous time the service times are i.i.d exponentially distributed with
rate µ and thus have a probability density function PSi(s) = µe
−µs, whereas
for the discrete case, they are geometrically distributed with probability mass
function PSi(s) = µ(1− µ)s−1.
3.2 Detecting Covert Communication
The countermeasures to covert timing channels could be divided into two cat-
egories: detection and disruption. The detection of covert timing channels is
based on statistical tests that can distinguish between legitimate and covert
traffic. The disruption (e.g. jamming) of covert timing channels is done by
an active warden that aims to prevent the covert communication, usually
with the undesired side effect of degraded system performance. While the
focus of earlier work has been mainly on disrupting or completely eliminat-
ing covert timing channels [24, 25], recent works have focused more on their
detection [14, 27]. This is mainly because the disruption of timing channels
is usually costly – either in terms of resources used to actively monitor the
traffic or the degradation of the system performance. One possible disruption
is random delaying of the traffic, which reduces the performance possibly by
reducing the capacity or increasing the error rates of covert timing chan-
nels. Another disruption would be to inject false packets. However, such
a countermeasure is both costly in terms of the attacker resources and the
lost capacity of the legitimate users of the channel. Therefore, it is highly
desirable to employ disruption mechanisms only after one has verified the
presence of a covert channel reliably.
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Some special-purpose detection tests that are designed for specific covert
timing channels include Cabuk et al.’s [14] -similarity for IP covert timing
channels and Berk et al.’s [27] mean-max ratio to test for binary or multi-
symbol covert timing channels. The mean-max ratio test assumes that the
legitimate IPDs follow a normal distribution, which is often not true for real
network traffic.
The following sub-sections will explain some well-known tests that are
employed to detect a covert channel and will be used in the later chapters to
analyze the visibility of our schemes.
3.2.1 Regularity Test
Regularity tests are based on the assumption that the covert traffic is more
regular than the legitimate traffic. One example of such a test is Cabuk et
al.’s heuristic regularity test [14] which examines whether the variance in the
inter-arrival times remains small. Specifically, the test traffic is separated
into non-overlapping windows of packets. For each window i, the standard
deviation σi of the inter-arrival times is computed. If the standard deviation
of the pairwise differences between all pairs σi and σj for i < j remains
small, the traffic is considered highly regular and hence the presence of a
covert channel is declared.
3.2.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Statistical analyses are commonly used to decide if two sets of data belong
to the same distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is one of the
most commonly used statistical tests that can detect if two data sets belong
to the same distribution or not. It differs from other tests by being a non-
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parametric test, i.e. it does not depend on the distribution of the data. It
evaluates the equality of one-dimensional distributions of probability. Peng
et al. [29] used this technique to successfully distinguish between a flow that
contained a watermark and a legitimate flow.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test evaluates the similarity between two se-
quences, by finding the maximum distance in their empirical distribution
functions [38] and is based on the earlier works of Kolmogorov [30] and
Smirnov [31]. An attacker can look at the flows arriving at a compromised
host and calculate the maximum empirical difference between the flow and
a known legitimate flow. If the difference is large, then the attacker declares
that it contains a covert message.
The maximum distance between two cumulative distributions will be re-
ferred to as the K-S distance and is represented by dK . The K-S distance
between two flows is measured as
dK = sup
x
(|FA(x)− FB(x)|) (3.10)
where FA(x) and FB(x) are the empirical distribution functions of two data
sets A and B that are to be compared, which in the later chapters will be
the IPDs of two flows.
3.2.3 Entropy Detection
Developed by Gianvecchio and Wang [28] entropy detection is one of the lat-
est detection techniques capable of identifying the existence of a timing chan-
nel, since the existence of the timing channel affects the entropy of the packet
flow. They tested their design on three covert timing channels [14, 39, 40],
and found that the combination of the entropy (EN) and the corrected condi-
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tional entropy (CCE) on a sequence of binned data is effective at recognizing
a covert timing channel.
The EN is simply the first-order entropy where a low entropy coveys the
existence of a timing channel. The entropy rate, which can be used to measure
complexity and regularity, is estimated on a finite data set using the corrected
conditional entropy given by
CCE(Xγ|Xγ−1) = CE(Xγ|Xγ−1) + perc(Xγ)EN(X1) (3.11)
where CE is the condition entropy, perc(Xγ) is the percentage of unique
pattern of length γ and EN(X1) is the first-order entropy. The estimate of
the entropy rate is the minimum of equation (3.11) over all possible values
of γ.
To get the sequences, the data is binned into B bins where the suggested
values of B for the corrected conditional entropy is B = 5 and for the entropy
test is B = 65536. The authors provided an implementation of their design
using a B-ary tree of height γ where the leaves are patterns of length γ and
the children of the root are patterns of length γ = 1. Therefore a breath-
first-search gives the corrected conditional entropy for each level.
3.2.4 Multi-Flow Attack
Kiyavash et al. [3] showed that using interval-based watermarking techniques
leads to time dependent correlations. They provided a simple and effective
technique that does not have much computational complexity, and not only
will detect a watermark but is also capable of extracting hidden watermark
parameters, resulting in its removal at a low cost. They had demonstrated
this scheme on existing interval-based watermarks [23, 18, 41], successfully
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locating cleared intervals and removing the watermark. It is shown to weaken
against watermarks located at multiple positions [3].
The attacker, who is in control of a compromised host, could create flows,
that will not be relayed, to monitor the flows at the compromised host. Need-
ing as few as 10 watermarked flows, the attacker would simply line up the
flows and observe the unusually high number of empty intervals caused by
emptying out intervals when embedding the watermark. Using this tech-
nique, the attacker can then extract the required parameters, and remove
the watermark from all flows that will be relayed through the compromised
host.
The multi-flow attack takes a histogram of the sorted union of a few water-
marked flows. The detection of a high number of empty intervals shows the
presence of a watermark. Kiyavash et al. showed that if the same watermark
message is present in all the flows, then as few as 10 watermarked flows are
required to detect the watermark. If the watermark message differs in each
flow, the attacker needs to aggregate a subset of flows that contain the same
bit value to detect empty intervals.
3.3 Low-Density Parity-Check Codes
Gallager introduced low-density parity-check codes back in his 1960 doctoral
dissertation [42] which are shown to achieve capacity [43]. These codes can
be decoded using iterative decoding techniques such as the sum-product al-
gorithm [44, 45, 46] which will be explained in Section 3.4. The codes are
defined by a parity-check matrix H, which is a sparse parity-check matrix
with m rows and n columns and m < n, where n is the the block length and
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m is the number of parity-checks. The set C represents the set of codewords
C = {x : Hx = 0} (3.12)
The space C represents all sets of codewords x ∈ C that satisfy the con-
dition Hx = 0. A transformation on equation (3.12) yields equation (3.13)
which generates the codeword x using a length-κ vector u and a generator
matrix G which is an n by κ matrix. The generator matrix is used to map a
length-κ (κ = n−m) information vector u to a length-n codeword vector x.
x = Gu (3.13)
Equation (3.14) below is an example of a parity-check matrix. Each column
is associated with a codeword bit – column 1 with x1, column 2 with x2,
etc. Each row represents a parity-check where a ‘1’ signifies that this bit
contributes to the parity-check. This implies equation (3.15)
H =

0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
 (3.14)
x2 ⊕ x4 = 0
x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 = 0
x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x5 = 0
(3.15)
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3.4 Sum-Product Algorithm and Factor Graphs
The sum-product algorithm is an iterative message passing algorithm to cal-
culate the marginal distributions. This algorithm is used to decode low-
density parity-check codes (given in Section 3.3), but in various other areas
iterative decoding techniques are an instance of the sum-product algorithm
such as the forward-backward and Veterbi algorithms for hidden Markov
models or the Kalman filter for signal processing [47].
The sum-product algorithm is solved using graphical models called factor
graphs. One specific type of factor graph called the Forney factor graph [48]
uses square nodes to denote function and edges or half-edges to denote the
variables. Suppose ei is an edge of a node g, then g is a function of ei.
Suppose g is a function over variables {e∗, e1, . . . , en}. Let µg→e∗ be the
‘message’ sent from node g along edge e∗, then
µg→e∗ ,
∑
e1,...,en
g(e∗, e1, . . . , en) µe1→g(e1) . . . µen→g(en) (3.16)
For example, Figure 3.2 is a graphical representation of equation (3.17)
which finds the marginal distribution of x3 over a function f that can be
factored into functions f1, f2, f3, f4.
x1
x2 x4
x7r
r r
rf1 f2 f3
f4
x5x3
x6
µf1→x3 µf2→x3 µf3→x5 µ
f
4 →
x
6
2
Figure 3.2: Forney factor graph representation.
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f(x3) =
∑
x1,x2,x4,x5,x6,x7
f(x1, x2, x2, x4, x5, x6, x7)
=
∑
x1,x2,x4,x5
f1(x1, x2, x3)f2(x3, x4, x5)f3(x5, x7, x6)f4(x6)
=
∑
x1,x2
f1(x1, x2, x3)
∑
x4,x5
f2(x3, x4, x5)
∑
x5,x6
f3(x5, x7, x6)f4(x6)
(3.17)
where each factor can be summarized as a closed box (µ) over the internal
variables enclosed within the dashed boxes of Figure 3.2, which results in the
following
f(x3) =
∑
x1,x2
f1(x1, x2, x3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
µf1→x3
∑
x4,x5
f2(x3, x4, x5)
µf3→x6︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
x5,x6
f3(x5, x7, x6)f4(x6)︸ ︷︷ ︸
µf2→x3
f(x3) = µf1→x3 µf2→x3
(3.18)
Notice that equation (3.18) matches the equation in equation (3.17); therefore
using the sum-product algorithm we can recursively solve for each edge of
the graph.
3.5 Practical Codes for Timing Channels
Coleman and Kiyavash [49] designed a coding scheme capable of achieving
the fundamental limits of the timing channel given in Section 3.1.2. This
section will explain the mechanism of their encoding and decoding scheme,
which will be used in Chapter 4.
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3.5.1 Encoder Structure
The encoder controls the IPDs between successive packets. It needs to en-
code a message defined on [0, Q− 1], but the IPDs of a normal network flow
follow certain distributions. On a continuous time scale, these delays are
exponentially distributed, and on a discrete time scale, they are geometri-
cally distributed. To map each bit of the encoded message to an IPD, the
encoder utilizes a shaping technique that is capable of transforming a uni-
formly random variable into one with the desired distribution. Given this
technique, the encoding now require generating a uniformly distributed ran-
dom variable for each bit of the message. To generate the required uniformly
distributed inputs, the encoder employs dithers that are proven to generate
a uniformly distributed random variable. Moreover, the encoder also uses
linear coset codes defined on a finite field that is shown to be capable of
achieving capacity.
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Figure 3.3: The stages in the encoding process that maps each xi to an either
exponential or geometric inter-arrival time given by zi. The dithering stage
ensures the distribution is uniform, and shaping ensures that the distribution
matches the Poisson distribution of the arrival process.
Figure 3.3 gives an overview of the encoding process:
• The process X first undergoes a dithering process that ensures that the
distribution is uniform resulting in Y .
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• The result Y is transformed into the required exponential or geometric
distribution through shaping forming Z.
• The IPDs of the input flow are given by zi, i.e. Iai = zi.
Low-Density Parity-Check Codes
We use a coset code construction [50] defined over a finite field with maximum
likelihood decoding that is shown to achieve capacity ([44, 51]). These coset
codes use the sparse graph code given by:
C = {x : Hx = s¯} (3.19)
where H is an m by n matrix and s¯ is called the syndrome of length m, and
all operations are defined over the finite field FQ (see Section 3.3).
Dithering
Each bit xi is mapped to a uniform distribution by
yi =
[
xi
Q
+ ξi
]
mod 1
(3.20)
where ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξn are i.i.d uniformly distributed dithers on [0, 1].
The yi in equation (3.20) are uniformly distributed since
xi ∈ [0, Q− 1]
xi
Q
∈
[
0
Q− 1 ,
Q− 1
Q
] (3.21)
which is uniformly distributed for large values of Q. Dithering serves two
purposes [52, 53, 54, 55]:
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• It ensures that yi is statistically independent of xiQ .
• By the Crypto lemma [55, Lemma 2], the equation (3.20) is uniformly
distributed.
The second point is key to the next step that maps each uniformly distributed
yi to a value with the required distribution.
Shaping
A continuous flow should consist of i.i.d exponentially distributed IPDs, and
in the discrete case, it should have a geometric distribution. In the earlier
steps of encoding, uniformly distributed inputs were achieved. To get these
inputs to have the desired distribution, a technique called shaping is used.
This technique maps each uniformly distributed random variable to one with
the desired distribution. Given a uniformly distributed variable Y on [0, 1],
a random variable Z is constructed with the desired cumulative distribution
FZ(z) by (see Appendix C.1)
Z = F−1Z (Y ) (3.22)
The cumulative distribution F for an exponential random variable with
rate λ is given by
FZ(z) = 1− e−λz (3.23)
And given a uniformly distributed Y on [0, 1],
Z = − ln(1− Y )
λ
(3.24)
Combining the dithering and shaping steps, a transformation matrix Ψ(.)
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can be defined which maps from a uniformly distributed random variable
xi ∈ FQ to an exponentially or geometrically distributed zi:
Zi = Ψ(xi)
= F−1Z
([
xi
Q
+ ξi
]
mod 1
) (3.25)
which is a table with n rows and Q columns, having n functions Ψi : FQ → R.
This lookup table (LUT) is shared between the encoder and decoder.
3.5.2 Decoding Structure
The decoder of [49] exploits the graphical structure of the probabilistic dy-
namics of a queuing system given in equation (3.8). Each arrival time ai
depends on the arrival of the previous packet ai−1 and the IPD associated
with the Ψ transformation on xi. Similarly, the service times depend on
the current and previous departure times and the current arrival time (Sec-
tion 3.1.3). The only parameters that the decoder has knowledge of are the
departure times dn, the sparse matrix H, the syndrome s¯ and the transfor-
mation table Ψi. Due to the encoding structure, the decoder employs the
standard low-complexity message-passing algorithms (the sum-product al-
gorithm) on a Forney factor graph based on the graphical structure of the
queuing channel and the encoding constraint given by equation (3.19) (see
Figure 3.4) to produce low bit-error rates even at rates close to capacity.
In [56], to reduce decoding complexity from quadratic to linear, two tech-
niques are employed: Little’s law (Appendix C.2) and discretization of time
in the continuous case where the times are binned into a discrete time scale
with some small fixed resolution.
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Figure 3.4: Forney factor graph of Hx=s¯.
3.6 CSMA/CA in IEEE 802.11
The MAC layer of the IEEE Standard 802.11 for Wireless Local Access Net-
works (WLANs) uses CSMA/CA for collision avoidance [57].
The main idea behind the CSMA/CA collision avoidance strategy is that
the channel is always sensed before any transmission. If the channel is sensed
busy, the sender waits until the channel is idle and then goes through a ran-
dom back-off period before retrying. The random back-off period ensures
fairness among contending transmissions. More precisely, the transmission
occurs only if, during a fixed period of time equal to a distributed inter-
face state (DIFS), the channel is sensed idle. If the sensed channel is busy
during or immediately after the DIFS, the station continues monitoring the
30
New packet 
to send
Sense medium 
state
Transmit
Spacing of 
consecutive 
packets
Set random 
backoff timer
Busy
Idle 
Figure 3.5: A flow chart depicting the flow of the CSMA/CA protocol that
avoids collision in packet transmission using exponential back-off time. The
sender only sends when the channel is sensed to be idle, otherwise it waits
a random exponential time, ensuring fairness between various packet trans-
missions.
channel until the channel is sensed idle for a DIFS period. At this time, the
CSMA/CA generates a random back-off interval before transmitting to avoid
the possible collisions by minimizing the probability of collision with pack-
ets transmitted by other radios. Even if the medium is sensed idle during
the DIFS period, a radio waits a random back-off time between consecu-
tive transmission of two packets to avoid channel capture. The flowchart in
Figure 3.5 shows the basic steps of the CSMA/CA at the transmitting radio.
Moreover for each packet transmission, an exponential back-off method is
used, and to signal a successful packet transmission, an ACK is transmitted
by the destination radio. This ACK is automatically transmitted at the end
of the packet, after a short inter-frame space (SIFS). Since the combination
of the SIFS and channel delay is shorter than DIFS, the channel cannot be
detected idle for a DIFS until the end of an ACK.
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CHAPTER 4
A TIMING CHANNEL SPYWARE FOR
CSMA/CA PROTOCOL
4.1 Introduction
Rapid technological advances in wireless communication and the growth in
the number and diversity of applications and services raise the demand for
data-integrity and communication security. The complexity of the emerging
applications and platforms introduces newer vulnerabilities that need to be
carefully identified, analyzed, and addressed.
The emerging 802.xx standard protocols must be continually enriched with
security features to meet the new and more critical application demands. For
instance, the IEEE 802.22 is a cognitive radio standard being developed to
bring broadband access to less populated rural areas by using vacant TV
channels. To address the complex adaptive nature required by the technol-
ogy, a cognitive radio device is typically implemented by a general purpose
computer processor that also runs radio application software. As a result,
this standard is susceptible to spyware and malicious software or hardware.
In this chapter, we will present a new transparent and robust covert com-
munication scheme that can reliably leak the chip data to outside entities
by exploiting the timing channel resulting from the inter-arrival times of the
legitimate transmitted packets. Our scheme can be embedded within any
medium access control (MAC) protocol that avoids collision in packet retrans-
missions by using an exponential back-off rule. For instance, the IEEE 802.11
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Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) standard’s main MAC layer protocol,
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), is an
example of a widely used protocol that employs such a rule.
The effects of the CSMA/CA’s back-off rule perturbs packet timings by
virtue of queuing and hence introduce a non-standard noisy channel that
interferes with timing-based communication purposes. Although the maxi-
mum rate of information exchange of such channels (i.e. capacity) was char-
acterized in [10], only recently have practical encoding/decoding methods to
instantiate the theoretical limit with low (i.e. linear) complexity been intro-
duced [49]. However, to date there have been no practical covert information
encoding methods with low encoder/decoder complexity to instantiate the
findings of [10]. Here we establish the first reliable covert timing channel
that is also robust to the effects of CSMA/CA’s back-off rule.
We identify the following performance metrics and evaluate them on our
architecture:
1. Transparency of the spyware circuitry: This criterion pertains to the
efficiency of implementation at the encoder to prevent the detection of
the spyware circuitry.
2. Robustness: This criterion tests the robustness of the communication
scheme to heterogeneous CSMA/CA effects which act as noise.
3. Transparency of the covert channel: This criterion measures the diffi-
culty of the covert channel detection.
We evaluate criterion 1 completely theoretically. Criterion 2 is evaluated by
simulating a wireless CSMA/CA architecture and testing the robustness of
the decoder in different heterogeneous wireless conditions. Criterion 3 is con-
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firmed experimentally using state-of-the-art covert timing channel detection
methods.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We present the first design of spyware integrated within the communi-
cation circuitry of wireless CSMA/CA that exploits the timing channel
resulting from the inter-arrival times of packets to leak data from the
chip.
• We introduce the first covert channel encoding that practically attains
rates near the fundamental limits utilizing some methodologies devel-
oped in [49].
• Our spyware employs a low-complexity error-correcting code framework
that is robust to timing perturbations resulting from the CSMA/CA’s
collision avoidance back-off strategy. This back-off strategy introduces
a non-standard queuing noisy channel that interferes with timing-based
communication purposes.
• We show the difficulty of the spyware detection, both at the hardware
level and at the packet timing level, from both theoretical and practical
perspectives.
• To substantiate our theoretical findings and to evaluate the overhead,
the spyware is implemented and tested on the widely used WARP wire-
less radio platform [58].
The subject is organized as follows. The related literature was previously
surveyed in Sections 2.1 and 2.4, and the preliminaries were described in Sec-
tions 3.1, 3.6 and 4.3. Section 4.3 introduces the theoretical results for covert
channel embedding. In Section 4.4, we devise the new spyware embedding
34
algorithm. Detection of the spyware in circuitry and at the communication
channel is presented in Section 4.5. Comprehensive experimental results for
implementation, simulations, and detection are demonstrated in Section 4.6.
We conclude in Section 4.7.
4.2 Mechanism and Coding Scheme
In this section, we will we summarize the methods for triggering the spyware
and the mechanism and reason for using the coding scheme explained in
Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Triggering the Spyware
The spyware is activated upon the arrival of a trigger, which may come from
either from internal or external sources. The spyware does not need to be
active all the time. We call the active duration of a spyware the spying
interval. An internal spyware trigger comes from within the hardware. The
two most obvious choices for an internal incitement are the states of the
registers in the design and the clock. The states of the register can be utilized
in a number of ways – for example, by arriving at a certain internal state
of the communication controller, or upon reaching a certain counter state.
Since we implement the trigger at the hardware level and integrate it within
the design, it is impossible to detect these types of signals by studying the
radio output.
The external triggers have to find a way for the outside source to reach the
spyware. The most common method is via the communication channel. Note
that other hardware interfaces to the outer world, such as sensors or power
lines, can be used as extrinsic stimuli. The covert communication channel
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can also be used for signaling the trigger. For example, the radio can be
intentionally kept busy for certain time intervals. An important observation
is that the external trigger does not have to be sent via the covert channel.
For example, the receiver can be manipulated such that a certain combination
of the input signals would not create an interrupt to the layers above. At
the same time, the carrier sense signal can be raised high by the spyware,
disallowing the legitimate messages to route via the communication channel.
Unless the secret trigger combination is known and the radio is under physical
tests observing its activity, detecting this type of external trigger is extremely
difficult, if not impossible.
4.3 Covert Communication with Timings
Historically, timing channels are synonymous with covert channels [1, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 14, 27, 9]. Figure 4.1 illustrates a covert timing channel between an
infected transmitter and a legitimate receiver. The warden (a.k.a eavesdrop-
per) sees the exchange of packets but fails to realize the covert communication
in the packet timings. On the other hand, the spyware receiver, which has
side information pertaining to the parameters of the encoding scheme (see
Section 3.5.2), can decode the message conveyed through the timings. As
mentioned in Section 4.2, the CSMA/CA protocol results in random delays
in the packet inter-arrival times. We will model the impact of the CSMA/CA
as a first-come first-served (FCFS) queuing system. In particular, a special
case of an FCFS queuing timing channel is the exponential server timing
channel (ESTC)(Section 3.1.1), where the service times are explained in Sec-
tion 3.1.3. We are using the ESTC as a model for the queuing channel for
the CSMA/CA protocol since the ESTC has the smallest capacity among
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Figure 4.1: The warden monitors the communication between an infected
transmitter and a legitimate receiver. Although the transmitter leaks spied
information within packets timings, the warden is unable to decode the mes-
sages modulated by the packet timings.
all FCFS queuing channels with the same average service rate [59]; hence,
a covert communication scheme that can survive the ESTC is most likely
robust to other types of queuing noise. The maximum rates for an ESTC
are given in Section 3.1.2; however, it was not clear until recently [49] how
to develop practical codes that can withstand the noise from the queueing
channels and approach the fundamental limits given by equation (3.1). In
this chapter, we will use a similar code construction of the coding scheme,
explained in Section 3.5, for the purpose of covert communication over a tim-
ing channel introduced due to queuing effects of CSMA/CA, as illustrated
in Figure 4.2. The coding scheme involves an algebraic code construction
that allows for a simple encoder, thus lending itself nicely to the design of
in-circuit spyware. In our encoding structure, the encoder module uses the
generator-representation of the code given by
x = Gu + p (4.1)
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Figure 4.2: An infected transmitted transmits spied information in the form
of bits which are encoded into the arrival times of the user packet stream
using a spyware device. The packets are sent over the wireless medium which
employs CSMA/CA which will be modeled as a ·/M/1 queue.
where a length-κ (κ = n − m) information vector is mapped to a length-n
codeword vector x by use of an n by κ generator matrix G and a length-n
vector p. The decoder module resides in software at the spyware receiver,
and upon receiving the packets, it decodes the transmitted message using
the inter-packet times of the departure process (as depicted in Figure 3.1).
4.4 Implementation
The CSMA/CA which constitutes the communications MAC layer may be
implemented in software or hardware. Either way, the MAC needs to interact
with the physical layer (PHY) and the hardware components that provide
the necessary information for the correct operation of the protocol. The PHY
layer can be modified without affecting the upper layer MAC or notifying the
changes to any of the higher layers, or even providing false information to
them. Figure 4.3 shows different ways of interaction between the MAC and
the PHY layer. The MAC queries the PHY for the status of the medium and
timing information. As can be seen on the figure, the PHY can be modified to
mislead the MAC by sending false timing information to it, or even notify the
MAC that the medium is busy when it is idle. Perhaps the most important
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means for spying the information at this layer is that the front transmission
and reception of the packets must be done through the PHY.
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Figure 4.3: Interaction between the CSMA/CA which constitutes the MAC
layer, and the physical layer.
In our implementation of the spyware, we modify the PHY so that the
timings of the sent packets are altered in order to covertly send the stolen
data to the outside world. To achieve this goal, we implement the encoder
explained in Section 4.3 using the generator matrix given in equation (4.1).
The block diagram of the encoder circuit is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: A block diagram showing the encoding circuit of the spyware.
Both the g nerator matrix G and the length-n vector p are hard-coded in
the PHY layer. G is generated for a specific finite field FQ. Algorithm 1 shows
the steps for constructing the circuit representing multiplications by G. First,
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a template table Ψ is constructed for FQ, which has Q entries representing
small circuits that perform addition and multiplication of constants from 0
to Q− 1 with a variable in FQ. The circuits in the template table are simple
XOR gates, constants, or wires. The circuit is generated by the loop in Lines
5 to 7 in the algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Encoding with the Generator matrix G
Require: Q: the field size to be used, G: n× κ matrix over FQ, Ψ: Q×Q
matrix over FQ.
1: Input: u, the input vector to the circuit of size κ
2: Output: x¯, the output vector of the circuit of size n
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: X¯(i)=0
5: for j = 1 to κ do
6: X¯(i)=X¯(i)⊕Ψ(G(i, j), u(j))
7: end for
8: end for
The final circuit is just a network of XOR gates. The output of this circuit
is then added to the constant vector p. This step is also hard-coded in the
circuit by inverting some of the bits of x¯ to generate x. Each element in x
represents an index for a specific inter-arrival time value stored in the LUT.
The elements of x are traversed using a counter, which is reset when the
trigger is raised. Every time a packet is successfully transmitted, the counter
is incremented for generating the next inter-arrival time.
4.5 Spyware Detection
The spyware can be distinguished either by realizing the presence of the
spyware circuitry on the chip or by detecting the covert timing channel. We
next show that neither of these two measures are feasible.
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4.5.1 Detection of Spyware Circuitry
It should be noted that the above circuitry of Section 4.4 is mainly combi-
national and can be interwoven and concealed within the sea of gates in the
PHY and the communication signal processing circuitry. Only a few latches
are used for the counter and the LUT, which can also be effectively embedded
within the regular combinational logic in the circuit. The overhead presented
by the encoder is a function of the size of G. However, while a smaller G
provides a smaller overhead, there is a tradeoff between the size of G and
the accuracy of decoding the encoded message. An example implementation
of the encoder and the tradeoff between the overhead and accuracy of the
decoder is shown in Table 4.1 of Section 4.6.1.
Our implementation method renders the removal attack almost impossible:
it is well known that reverse-engineering the functionality of the circuit by
accessing the gate-level information and even the layout information is not
practically possible [34]. This is because the synthesis step of the design
which transforms the functional specifications into the gate-level consists
of several optimizations that do not maintain the functional relationships.
Note that circuit verification cannot reveal the spyware either. The circuit
is verified for having the same functionality as the protocol specification
by means of checking the integrity of the protocol states. Verification does
not generally detect (verify) the unknown added states. Furthermore, the
verification criteria are often set by the designer, who is also the spyware
implementer in our case and can effectively hide the spyware from the other
verifiers.
Note that the currently available Trojan detection methods are unable to
detect our circuit-level manipulations and spyware. All of the Trojan detec-
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tion methods are based on the assumption that the original circuit’s hardware
description (the netlist or GDSII files that the designer sends to the foundry)
are available at the detector [33]. The adversarial model is that the foundry
is changing the circuitry by adding components. The designer gets the ICs
back and can test to see if the IC is implementing the original design. In our
model, the designer is modifying the circuit herself and ultimately decides
the number and arrangement of gates. Furthermore, given the complexity of
the state-of-the-art designs, reverse-engineering is not practical.
Let us assume a scenario in which another entity designs a circuit with
exactly the same functionality. Even this circuit would not provide a good
comparison point, because of the degree of freedom in selecting the design
components. In other words, there is no minimum number of gates or par-
ticular arrangement of them that can be computed for a given specification,
so there would be little relevance between the new entity’s design and the
original circuitry without the spyware. Thus, this attack is not at all valid
on our spyware.
4.5.2 Detection of Covert Communication
Earlier measures against the timing channel have focused on disruption tech-
niques to eliminate the covert channel. Notably, our wireless timing channel
is susceptible to injection of false packet events by an external entity. For
instance, a second node that transmits cover traffic claiming the identity of
the node containing the spyware. However, such measures come at the cost
of the loss of the legitimate user’s channel capacity and the resources of the
attacker. Another countermeasure focuses on identifying the covert channel.
If the modifications made to the timings of the flow are visibly different to an
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observer, as in our case, once the presence of spyware deduced covert chan-
nels is detected, the observer will eliminate the covert channel by eradicating
the spyware.
We check the detection resistance of our scheme against the current state-
of-the-art covert timing channel detection tests – the regularity test, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the entropy detection test, explained in Sec-
tion 3.2. In Section 4.6, we will show that none of the above tests can reliably
detect the presence of covert communication under certain conditions.
4.6 Experimental Results
The hardware-based covert channel spyware was implemented using the Wire-
less Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) [58], which is a scalable, exten-
sible programmable wireless platform that enables advanced wireless network
prototyping. The encoder is implemented in hardware, and its overhead when
integrated within the WARP platform is reported for different encoder sizes
in Section 4.6.1. The decoder is implemented in software using Matlab, since
we do not study the spying receiver’s architecture. We also perform network
level simulations, where the communication among the different nodes in-
troduces interfering network traffic. The goal is to evaluate the accuracy of
decoding in the presence of random interference as well as to study whether
the covert flow can be detected by traffic analysis. Our studies require two
types of experimental setups: hardware setup and software simulation setup.
The details of the hardware setup are as follows:
• The Vertix2P7 FPGA on the WARP platform is used for the encoder
implementation. The spyware encoder is implemented in Verilog and
integrated within the physical layer blocks on the FPGA.
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• CSMA/CA MAC layer protocol is implemented on the PowerPC hard-
core processor embedded in the WARP FPGA.
• The physical layer blocks with the exception of the analog front-end
are all implemented on the WARP FPGA.
• A field size Q = 4 and GF (4) operations are used for encoding.
• Three different sizes of the encoding matrix (G) are implemented: 20×
8, 40× 16, and 80× 32.
The details of the simulation setup are as follows:
• Aside from the spyware encoder and its intended receiver, there are K
other nodes (possibly interfering) in the wireless network.
• The transmitting nodes send out the packets according to a Bernoulli
process, with burstiness probability Bp.
• The spyware information is encoded in the timings of the packets, as
discussed in Section 3.5.1, for a fixed encoder rate of κ
n
log2Q = 0.4
bits/packet, and λ = 0.225 packets/sec.
• The collision management scheme in the CSMA/CA protocol intro-
duces queuing of the packets – thus acting as a queuing timing channel,
as discussed in Section 4.2.
• The spyware decoder senses the transmission times of the wireless radio,
which act as the departure process of the queue, and uses the iterative
probabilistic decoder discussed in Section 3.5.2.
As we discussed in Section 4.1, the performance of our spyware is evaluated
with regards to three criteria:
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• Transparency of the spyware circuitry.
• Robustness of the communication scheme to heterogeneous CSMA/CA
effects.
• Transparency of the covert communication scheme.
4.6.1 Transparency of the Spyware Circuitry
In this subsection, we study the transparency of the spyware circuitry. This
is done by evaluating the cost of integrating the hardware encoder on the
FPGA. The field size (Q) is set to 4 for the implementation. A template table
implementing both addition and multiplication in GF (4) is constructed and
a C program is written to generate the encoder corresponding to any matrix
G of arbitrary size in Verilog. The encoder is then inserted within the WARP
platform physical blocks on the FPGA.
Table 4.1: The overhead introduced by the encoder implementation on a
WARP node for three encoding matrix sizes.
Original Small Medium Large
# Overhead # Overhead # Overhead
Slices 24,518 24,531 0.05% 24,643 0.50% 24,993 1.94%
Gates 18,741,445 18,741,598 0.00% 18,742,966 0.01% 18,747,184 0.03%
Table 4.1 shows the overhead introduced by the encoder implementation on
a WARP node. The first column in Table 4.1 is labeled original and presents
the original area of the wireless node components on the WARP. The area is
given in terms of the number of slices used on the FPGA and the estimated
number of gates in the design. The next two columns show the area of the
wireless node on the FPGA when we integrate an encoder with small matrix
G of size 20×8. The percentage overhead in area in terms of FPGA slices is
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0.05%, while the overhead in terms of the extra number of gates is negligible.
The next four columns show the area and the percentage overheads when
using a matrix G with size 40 × 16, and 80 × 32, respectively. Naturally,
the overhead increases as the size of the matrix increases. Due to the very
small area overhead, the integration of the encoder has no impact on the
overall power of the WARP platform. Also, the encoder does not affect the
overall delay of the digital circuitry implementing the radio because it does
not affect the critical path of the digital design. Again we emphasize that
the overhead is only measurable by the original designer, and the original
unaltered files are never shared with any entity, including the foundry.
4.6.2 Robustness of the Communication Scheme to
Heterogeneous CSMA/CA Effects
In this subsection, we study the robustness of the spyware communication in
terms of the symbol error rate (SER) at the decoder. The SER is affected
by the queuing effects introduced by the CSMA/CA due to varying network
conditions. We generate multiple levels of interfering traffics on the network
by simulating different number of nodes that communicate in the range of
both the sender and receiver. It should be noted that the only purpose
of the network traffic is to introduce interference that can affect the times
of arriving packets carrying the spyware information. Table 4.2 shows the
average SER at the decoder. These average SER values are shown for various
numbers of interfering nodes, namely values of K ∈ {5, 10, 15}, as well as
burstiness probability Bp ∈ {0.4, 0.6} for three encoding matrix sizes (κ, n) ∈
{(8, 20); (16, 40); (32, 80)} corresponding to small, medium, and large on the
table, respectively.
Although the SER values are only on the order of 10−2, we bring attention
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to the specific context of this application: a short code-length, externally
triggered, and hardware implementation. Since this approach uses linear
coset codes (which have extremely small undetected error probability [60]),
an error event is essentially equivalent to the condition Hxˆ 6= s¯. Thus, the
spyware receiver can simply externally retrigger the transmission at a random
time in the future. As can be expected, Table 4.2 shows that as the length
of the code (size of the encoding matrix) increases, the average symbol error
rate at the decoder improves.
Figure 4.5 illustrates boxplots of the SER across multiple trials. The lower
edge of the rectangular plot corresponds to e.25, the 25th percentile; the upper
edge pertains to e.75, the 75th percentile. The 50th percentile, or median, ap-
pears as the horizontal line between the lower and upper bounds. The upper
‘tail’ of the box corresponds to the vertical line extending beyond the 75th
percentile, which is of length 1.5(e.75 − e.25). All outliers extending beyond
the ‘tail’ are explicitly drawn with the ‘+’ symbol. We see from Figure 4.5,
the statistical structure of the SER is highly concentrated near 0, in such a
way that cannot be evidenced by merely the mean SER. Specifically, the 25th
percentile of the errors is 0. In terms of externally triggered retransmissions,
this means that simple “majority-rules” decoding schemes will work partic-
ularly well with this approach. More specifically, while the average SER is
of the order of 10−2, around 25% of the time, the decoder receives symbols
with zero error and thus a majority decoding rule after 2 or 3 transmissions
will result in perfect decoding.
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Figure 4.5: Boxplots of the symbol errors across multiple trials, using the
large encoding matrix with burstiness probabilities Bp ∈ {0.4, 0.6} with 200
runs.
Table 4.2: Average SER of the spyware decoder vs. number of congesting
nodes. The study is done for different probabilities of sending packets over
the wireless medium, and the matrix sizes.
Number Burstiness prob. = 0.4 Burstiness prob. = 0.6
of nodes Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
5 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.05
10 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.07
15 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.08
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4.6.3 Transparency of the Covert Communication Scheme
In this subsection, we study the detectability of the covert information hid-
den in the network traffic by generating regular traffic and comparing the
traffic with spyware covert channels for various network settings. We use the
different traffic flows to generate inter-arrival times that are used as inputs
to three covert channel detection tests: the entropy detection, Komolgorov-
Smirnov and regularity tests of Section 3.2.
Table 4.3: Regularity test, using a window of size 100 packets, fails to detect
the presence of covert communication.
Small Medium Large
Packets Covert Non-covert Covert Non-covert Covert Non-covert
1000 0.36 0.3 0.36 0.3 0.35 0.3
2000 0.4 0.37 0.38 0.3 0.37 0.3
Table 4.3 gives the results for the regularity test with non-overlapping
windows of 100 packets over a collection of 1000 and 2000 packets. We
randomly injected an external trigger activating covert transmission of n =
20 (small), n = 40 (medium), or n = 80 (large) consecutive packets. As
mentioned earlier in Section 3.2.1, the regularity test of Cabuk et al. [14]
examines whether the traffic is more regular than expected with legitimate
traffic. Specifically, this test checks whether the variance of the inter-arrival
times remains small. As seen in Table 4.3, the regularity test completely fails
to detect the covert communication.
The results for the corrected conditional entropy test (CCE) and the en-
tropy test (EN) are given in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, respectively, over a
collection of 1000 and 2000 packets. Again we randomly injected an external
trigger activating covert transmission of n = 20 (small), n = 40 (medium),
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Table 4.4: Detection (PD) and false alarm (PFA) probabilities for using the
corrected conditional entropy (CCE) on the packet inter-arrival times.
Number PD PFA
of packets Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
1000 0.043 0.050 0.148 0.011 0.008 0.009
2000 0.058 0.082 0.178 0.011 0.008 0.010
Table 4.5: Detection (PD) and false alarm (PFA) probabilities for using the
entropy test (EN) on the packet inter-arrival times.
Number PD PFA
of packets Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
1000 0.046 0.056 0.066 0.010 0.090 0.090
2000 0.061 0.064 0.090 0.009 0.011 0.011
or n = 80 (large) consecutive packets. The false alarm event occurs when
all packets transmitted do not have a trigger but are erroneously deemed
to have been containing spyware covert timing information. The rightmost
column illustrates the false alarm probability (PFA) for the 1000 and 2000
packet transmission scenarios. Meanwhile, the detection event pertains to
the scenario where an external trigger is randomly injected into the packet
stream and it is successfully detected using the hypothesis testing procedure.
Detection probabilities (PD) are given for small, medium, and large matrix
sizes. The threshold was decided at the 99% confidence interval. We can see
that these tests either fail to detect the covert transmission or have very low
detection rates.
Table 4.6 gives results for the Komolgorov-Smirnov test where, over a col-
lection of 250, 500, 1000 and 2000 packets, we randomly injected an external
trigger activating covert transmission of n = 20 (small), n = 40 (medium),
or n = 80 (large) consecutive packets. In all cases, the threshold for the
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hypothesis testing procedure was the deviation of the Komolgorov-Smirnov
statistic, given by equation (3.10), beyond the 99% confidence interval. Over
1000 and 2000 packets, this approach is successfully undetectable: PD and
PFA are close to one another in virtually all scenarios. We note that for
larger matrix sizes, the deviation between PD and PFA increases as does the
probability of detection, thus illustrating a tradeoff between error tolerance
robustness and detection probability. Reducing the interval to 250 and 500
makes the transmission more visible, although the detection rates remain
low, except when n = 80 over 250 packets. In this case most of the covert
transmissions were detected.
Table 4.6: Detection (PD) and false alarm (PFA) probabilities for using a
Komolgorov-Smirnov test on the packet inter-arrival times.
Number PD PFA
of packets Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
250 0.0357 0.2820 0.9022 0.0105 0.0117 0.0133
500 0.0164 0.0280 0.3288 0.0115 0.0103 0.0106
1000 0.0114 0.0195 0.0258 0.0108 0.0107 0.0107
2000 0.0106 0.0122 0.0206 0.0105 0.0114 0.0107
4.7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown a new methodology for the design and implementation of
spyware communication circuits that exploits the CSMA/CA MAC protocol
properties to covertly leak the chip data to an intended spyware receiver.
Our proposed scheme is robust to the collision avoidance techniques in the
CSMA/CA protocol of the MAC layer. We interweave the encoder in the
states and transitions of the wireless transmitter pre-synthesis, such that
distinction and uncoupling of the spyware from the radio’s physical layer is
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impossible. The spying act is initiated upon an occasional external or internal
trigger. The proof-of-concept implementation is demonstrated on the widely
used Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP). Three metrics were
used for evaluation of the spyware performance: 1) efficiency of the encoder
implementation, which was theoretically demonstrated; 2) robustness of the
communication method to CSMA/CA effects, which was done by simulating
the wireless architecture across a range of parameters; and 3) difficulty of
covert channel detection that was shown to be resilient against the known
covert timing channels detection methodologies. While there exists a trade-
off between accuracy, overhead and detectability, our experimental results
show that our implemented spyware simultaneously meets the above desired
metrics.
Some possible future directions include detection of the “trigger” time, or
the time at which covert communication begins. The detection can poten-
tially be done by the use of “change-point detection” approaches [61, 62] that
attempt to find the location in time where inter-arrival times drawn from a
distribution F0 switch to a distribution F1.
However, if the circuit-level design criterion permits more sophisticated
shaping schemes, even the change-point detection will fail. For instance, the
encoder’s shaping technique and dithering technique (equation (3.25)) of Sec-
tion 4.3 can be used to design provably undetectable covert communication
schemes. At a high level, the idea is that the dithering scheme discussed in
Section 4.3 has two important properties: It follows theoretically that any
statistical test that models normal traffic as i.i.d. with inter-packet timings of
distribution FZ will provably fail. More specifically, the inverse CDF, F
−1
Z (·),
can be simply shaped to any desirable legitimate traffic model, as long as the
inter-packet times are i.i.d.
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CHAPTER 5
WATERMARKING: TRACING TRAFFIC
FLOWS THROUGH THE NETWORK
5.1 Introduction
Detecting correlated network flows, a.k.a flow linking, is a crucial technique
in traffic analysis, specially in protecting against cyber-attacks, which have
continued to increase and cause financial damages [63]. By linking flows, an
attacker can defeat anonymous system such as Tor1. Moreover, flow linking
can help expose a stepping stone attacker who uses intermediate hosts to
attack a network system.
Many network intruders attack indirectly by relaying their traffic through
a series of intermediate hosts, known as stepping stones, to mask the source
of the attack. Often they encrypt their traffic by using secure protocols such
as SSH and telnet. An intruder, at a system, will set up a connection to an
unsecured host, and then launch attacks on a third system. The examination
of the attacking traffic would consider the unsecured intermediate host to be
the source, preserving the anonymity of the intruder. Since the contents of
packets are often encrypted or can easily be modified, studies have looked into
the characteristics of the traffic (packet timings, packet sizes, etc.) between
suspected connected flows, since there would be similar characteristics in
flows belonging to the same chain, however it may be routed through the
network. These features of the traffic can help correlate flows to help trace
1http://www.torproject.org
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the true source of the network traffic.
Recent work has shown that similarities in communication patterns such
as packet sizes and timings may be used for flow linking [16, 17, 18, 19]. Two
types of traffic analysis techniques, passive and active, are commonly used
for flow linking.
Passive analysis [15, 16, 20, 21] makes use of the original characteristics
in a packet flow, such as correlating periods of activity or idleness [16] or
finding a correlation measure based on the inter-packet delay (IPD) of the
flows [21]. These schemes rely only on the original characteristics in the
observed flows, which can be easily weakened by timing perturbations during
network transmissions. Therefore, successful detection using these schemes,
often require analysis of a large number of packets.
Active analysis schemes are able to perform reliable detection with shorter
flows by injecting patterns such as watermarks into the flows [17, 18, 19].
These schemes are also known as one-bit watermarks, since the watermark
contains no hidden messages and the decoder is only interested in detecting
the presence or absence of the watermark. The robustness and low complexity
of these watermarking have led to a growing research interest.
Flow watermarking approaches are mainly classified into two classes; in-
terval -based and IPD-based.
In interval-based schemes [18], the flow is first divided into fixed lengths
of time intervals. Then timing patterns of all packets within an interval
are reshaped to encode the watermark. Since the watermark pattern is em-
bedded within multiple packets, interval-based schemes are robust to packet
losses. However, shifting packets in groups causes visible ‘artifacts’ that in
turn can reveal the embedded watermark. Kiyavash et al. [3] showed that
interval-based watermarking schemes are vulnerable to the multi-flow attack,
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whereupon observing a few flows, the attacker can detect the watermark as
abnormally large number of empty time periods, that were created during
the embedding process.
Fortunately, the alternative solution, IPD-based flow watermarks resists
this attack. In IPD-based schemes [17, 22, 19], watermark bits are embedded
into the inter-arrival times of packets in a flow-dependent manner. Thus, it
is hard for the attacker to find noticeable artifacts even with access to many
watermarked flows. However, many schemes do not consider packet losses
that are possible in a network. The drawback of per-packet embedding is
that it requires synchronizations of packets for watermark detection, and
therefore packet losses could cause severe decoding errors.
This chapter proposes a novel IPD-based flow watermarking scheme that
can withstand packet losses. We embed the watermark within the IPDs using
quantization index modulation (QIM) [53], which is invisible even under
the multi-flow attack. To withstand packet losses that may lead to both
deletion and substitution errors, we develop a hidden Markov model (HMM)
for our channel which has dependent deletion and substitution error states.
At the detector, we use a maximum likelihood decoding algorithm, paired
with a forward-backward algorithm, for deriving the posterior probabilities.
Through simulations, we show that our scheme performs well in presence of
deletion and substitution errors, while not introducing any visible artifacts. It
is noteworthy that the substitution errors are introduced not only by network
jitters but also by packet deletions within the network that desynchronize the
watermark, because packet losses merge consecutive IPDs.
55
5.2 System Model
In this section, we describe the components of the proposed scheme. Fig-
ure 5.1 depicts our embedding and extraction procedures, starting with an
input flow with IPDs I.
w
wˆ
I
r
r
r
Sparsifier QIM Encoder r
Network
rQIM extractorHMM
k
ws m Iw
Iˆmˆ
Figure 5.1: Overview of our watermarking scheme.
Our encoding scheme consists of a sparsifier and QIM embedder, which
modifies the IPDs of the original flow to embed the watermark. As the
watermarked flow passes through the network, the IPDs are modified by net-
work jitters, and some packets are dropped. The decoding scheme consists of
two steps: the QIM extractor and HMM decoder, which analyze the received
flow and extract an estimate of the original watermark. The decoding scheme
decides if the original watermark is present in the received flow and if the
estimated watermark is similar to the original by the means of a threshold.
The following notations are used throughout the thesis.
• w: The original watermark w is a binary sequence of length N .
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• ws: A sparsified version of w extended to length ηN for an appropriate
integer η.
• wˆ: The estimate of w extracted at the HMM decoder.
• k: a length M pseudo-random binary sequence (key) available both at
the embedder and HMM decoder.
• m: The sequence of length M that is embedded into the flow’s IPDs by
the QIM embedder. Henceforth, it shall be referred to as the marker.
• mˆ: The estimate of m at the QIM extractor.
• I: The IPD sequence in the original flow.
• Iw: The IPD sequence after the QIM encoder embeds m within I .
• Iˆ: The IPD sequence received after transversing the network.
5.2.1 Sparsifier
In the first step of embedding, the binary watermark w is sparsified, by
mapping each bit of w to a longer binary sequence of length η according to a
deterministic sparsification table. The resulting sequence ws, is xored with
a key k resulting in m which is embedded into the flow I using QIM.
The sequence k serves as a ‘helper’ for watermark synchronization [64].
The intuition is that changes in the ‘pattern’ of k provide information about
deletions that have occurred. For instance, consider the case when ws is
all zeros: if k is 0111001001, then m is also 0111001001. If 01100101 was
received, it is easy to conclude that a 1 in the second run and a 0 in the fifth
run were deleted.
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In practice, any 1’s in ws will create a bit flip in k. Furthermore, the
network could introduce more substitution errors. Therefore to retain the
patterns of k necessary for synchronization, we need to ensure that ws is
sparse. It is noted that the choice of sparsification factor trades on the rate
of the watermark and the detection performance. However, in most flow
linking applications, rate is not of concern and a large sparsification factor
may be picked.
The sparsification density f is another parameter of this scheme also avail-
able during decoding. The density f is defined as the density of 1’s in the
sequence m, given by
f =
ηN∑
i=1
mi
ηN
where mi = w
s
i ⊕ ki (5.1)
5.2.2 QIM Embedder and Extractor
In the next step, we modify the IPDs in the original flow using QIM water-
marking. We pick a quantization step-size ∆, which is the distance between
two consecutive ‘0’ quantizers. The IPD Ii is changed to
Iwi =
 c∆ if mi = 0(c+ 0.5)∆ if mi = 1 (5.2)
As packets can only be delayed, we choose c to be the smallest integer such
that the change in Iwi would delay the ith packet.
The flows with IPDs Iwi , enters the network where it is subjected to net-
work jitters and packet losses. It is received at the decoding side as Iˆ and the
following QIM decoding function is used to recover the embedded bits mˆ.
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Figure 5.2: An example for substitution errors caused by IPD jitters. ‘x’s
are ‘0’ quantizers and ‘o’s are ‘1’ quantizers. The bit embedded on Ii is 1,
but the decoded bit from Iˆi is 0.
mˆi =
 mod (b
2Iˆi
∆
c, 2) if 2Iˆi
∆
− b2Iˆi
∆
c ≤ 0.5
mod (d2Iˆi
∆
e, 2) if 2Iˆi
∆
− b2Iˆi
∆
c > 0.5
(5.3)
In Figure 5.2, the IPD Iwi encodes a bit 1. If the network jitter increases
the IPD by less than ∆/4, the IPD Iˆ will still be close to the ‘1’ quantizer
(represented by ‘o’). But if the network jitter is greater than ∆/4 but less
than 3∆/4, then Iˆ will be closed to the ‘0’ quantizer (represented by ‘x’),
causing a decoding error. Therefore for some positive integer c,
mˆi 6= mi if (4c− 3)∆
4
< mod (Iˆ − Iwi ) ≤
(4c− 1)∆
4
(5.4)
5.2.3 HMM Decoder
At the HMM decoder, we first develop a hidden Markov model of the channel.
Based on this model, the posterior probabilities P (mˆ|wj) are calculated.
Watermark bits wj are subsequently decoded as wˆj using maximum likelihood
(ML) decoding.
Note that in Figure 5.1 the QIM embedder, the network, and the QIM
extractor could be regarded as a communication channel (within the dashed
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box) with two types of errors: substitutions and deletions. The substitution
error refers to a bit flip due either to network jitters or deletions that result
in the merger of IPDs. It has been shown that the network jitter may be
approximated as independently identically distributed Laplace random vari-
ables with zero mean and a standard deviation of σ [19] . Since during QIM
decoding we map each IPD to its closest quantizer, equation (5.4) provides
the range at which a substitution error will occur. Since there is a lower
probability of larger jitter values, for simplification we consider that any jit-
ter over ∆/4 would possibly result in a substitution error (see Figure 5.2). In
general, the probability of a substitution error caused by jitters is estimated
as2
Ps ≈ 2− (1 + sgn(∆
4
) · (1− e −|∆|2√2σ )). (5.5)
Transition Probabilities
The deletion error refers to a bit lost due to a packet drop. Davey and
Mackay [64] proposed a probabilistic decoding scheme to handle indepen-
dent deletion, insertion and substitution errors in a communication channel.
Our channel differs from the model in [64] as a single packet drop results in
the merger of two consecutive IPDs. For instance, in Figure 5.3, the deletion
of Packet 1 merges the bits m1 and m2 into m1⊕m2. This causes a deletion
of m1 and possibly a substitution error of m2 in the received stream. There-
fore, we develop a new channel model to handle dependent substitution and
deletion errors. Without loss of generality, we consider the packet deletion
probability Pd to be identical for all packets, and assume that Packet 0 is
2sgn(·) denotes the sign function.
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Figure 5.3: Merging of IPDs when packets are dropped.
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Figure 5.4: The HMM of the watermark-over-network channel.
Figure 5.4 depicts the HMM model of our channel. The hidden states
are defined as (αi, βi), where i = 1, 2, · · ·M . The notation βi is the drift of
packet i in the received flow. If k packets were dropped before packet i, then
βi equals −k. For example, in Figure 5.3, Packet 2 has drift of −1 due to
the loss of Packet 1, and Packet 5 has drift of −3 because of the loss of three
previous packets. The symbol αi denotes the accumulated bit when sending
Packet i. Again in Figure 5.3, before transmitting Packet 2, the bit in the
current IPD is a merger of m1 and m2, that is α2 = m1 ⊕ m2. Similarly,
α5 = m3⊕m4⊕m5. In general, αi equals to
∑i
j=r+1mj, where r is the index
of the last successfully received packet before Packet i. The observed states
of Figure 5.4 are the received bits mˆ. Note that the watermark extractor
3A scenario when the first packet is lost can easily be dealt with by repeating the
watermark in the network flow.
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receives max{βi + i− 1, 0} bits in total before Packet i is sent.
Posterior probabilities of this HMM model are required for the ML decoder
that extracts the watermark estimate wˆ. For this derivation, the transition
probability distribution, P (mˆi−1+βii−1+βi−1 , αi, βi|αi−1, βi−1), is required. These
transition probabilities can be calculated in terms of density f , deletion prob-
ability Pd and the substitution probability Ps of equation (5.5) (we need to
consider the possibility of occurrence of a substitution event when the current
packet is successfully received).
We use an example to illustrate how this quantity is computed. In Fig-
ure 5.3, when sending Packet 3, the hidden state is (β3 = −1, α3 = m3). If
Packet 3 is lost (with probability Pd), no new bit is transmitted, i.e. mˆ
β4+3
β3+3
is the empty sequence, ∅. The next state is (β4 = β3 − 1, α4 = α3 ⊕ k4 ⊕ws4)
(since m4 = k4 ⊕ ws4). When the sparsified sequence density f is small, ws4
may be modeled as a Bernoulli random variable with parameter f . Therefore,
P (∅, α3⊕k4⊕1, β3−1|α3, d3) is given by fPd, and P (∅, α3⊕k4⊕0, β3−1|α3, d3)
equals (1− f)Pd.
Referring to Figure 5.3, when sending Packet 2, the hidden state is (β2 =
−1, α2 = m2⊕m1), due to the loss of Packet 1. Since Packet 2 is successfully
transmitted, the next state becomes (β3 = −1, α3 = m3) and one new bit
is transmitted the sequence mˆ1. Assume that the new bit received had a
bit flip i.e. its value mˆ1 = α2 ⊕ 1, then P (mˆ1, k3 ⊕ 1, β3|α2, β2) is given by
f ∗ (1− Pd) ∗ Ps, and P (mˆ1, k3 ⊕ 0, β3|α2, β2) equals (1− f) ∗ (1− Pd) ∗ Ps.
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Therefore, the transition probabilities can be computed as follows
P (mˆi−1+βii−1+βi−1 , αi, βi|αi−1, βi−1) =
fPd, if βi = βi−1 − 1 and αi = αi−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1;
(1− f)Pd, if βi = βi−1 − 1 and αi = αi−1 ⊕ ki;
fPs(1− Pd), if βi = βi−1, αi = ki ⊕ 1 and mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1 ⊕ 1;
(1− f)Ps(1− Pd), if βi = βi−1, αi = ki and mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1 ⊕ 1;
f(1− Ps)(1− Pd), if βi = βi−1, αi = ki ⊕ 1 and mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1;
(1− f)(1− Ps)(1− Pd), if βi = βi−1;αi = ki; mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1
(5.6)
where βi = βi−1 − 1 indicates the loss of a packet, and mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1 ⊕ 1
indicates a bit flip.
Forward-Backward Algorithm and Maximum Likelihood (ML) Decoding
Once the complete HMM model is in place, the standard forward-backward
algorithm may be used to calculate the posterior probabilities P (mˆ|wˆj) for
j = 1, 2, · · · , N (see Appendix B).
The forward probability is the joint probability of receiving a sequence
mˆi−1+βi1 before transmitting the accumulated bit ai. It is given by
Fi(αi, βi) = P (mˆ
i−1+βi
1 , αi, βi)
=
∑
αi−1,
βi−1
Fi−1(αi−1, βi−1)P (mˆ
i−1+βi
i−1+βi−1 , αi, βi|αi−1, βi−1)
(5.7)
Similarly, the backward probability Bi(ai, βi) is defined and recursively
computed as
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Bi(αi, βi) = P (mˆ
end
i+βi
|αi, βi)
=
∑
αi+1,
βi+1
P (mˆ
i+βi+1
i+βi
, αi+1, βi+1|αi, βi)Bi+1(αi+1, βi+1) (5.8)
These forward and backward quantities are used by the ML decoder to
extract the watermark estimate wˆ. The posterior probability of the jth
watermark bit is expanded as
P (mˆ|wˆj) =
∑
αj− ,αj+ ,
βj− ,βj+
Fj−(αj− , βj−)F
′
j+
(αj+ , βj+)Bj+(αj+ , βj+) (5.9)
where j− = n · j and j+ = n · (j + 1) and
F ′k(tk, βk) = P (mˆ
k+dk−1
j−+βj−
, αk, βk|αj− , βj− , wˆj) (5.10)
and it is recursively computed as
F ′k(αk, βk) =∑
αk−1,
βk−1
F ′k−1(αk−1, βk−1)P (mˆ
k+βk−1
k−1+βk−1 , αk, βk|αk−1, βk−1, wˆj)
(5.11)
The transition probability in equation (5.11) can be similarly derived as
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in equation (5.6).
P (mˆi−1+βii−1+βi−1 , αi, βi|αi−1, βi−1, wˆj) =
Ps(1− Pd) if βi = βi−1; mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1 ⊕ 1;αi = wi ⊕ ki
(1− Ps)(1− Pd) if βi = βi−1; mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1;αi = wi ⊕ ki
Pd if βi = βi−1 − 1;αi = wi ⊕ ki ⊕ αi−1
.
where βi = βi−1 − 1 shows a packet loss which leads to merging of the IPDs
(αi = wi ⊕ ki ⊕ αi−1), and mˆi−1+βi−1 = αi−1 ⊕ 1 shows a substitution error.
Once the posterior probability in equation (5.10) is solved, wˆj can be de-
cided using simple maximum likelihood decoding, and the same decoding
procedure repeats for all watermark bits. Finally, the distance between wˆ
and the original watermark w is compared to a threshold to decide whether
the watermark is present.
5.3 Evaluation
To test the robustness of our scheme against network jitters and packet losses,
we have analyzed their effects on the true and false positive rates. The true
positives indicate the ratio of test cases where our scheme correctly detected
the presence of a watermark. The false positives, on the other hand, indicate
the ratio of test cases where our scheme detected the watermark in legitimate
non-watermarked flows. We evaluated our watermarking scheme on network
traffic generated from an independent Poisson process of rate λ = 3.3 packets
per second (pps), and length 2000 packets.
The following tests were studied to analyze the effects of varying the pa-
rameters set by the watermarking scheme – the watermark length and quan-
65
tization step-size – and the robustness of our scheme against network jitters
and packet deletions.
Each of the above scenarios was tested with varying parameters that will
be listed along with the test result. The parameters that are kept constant
through all the simulations are
• Sparsification factor η = 10.
• Network jitters, modeled as a Laplacian with zero mean and a standard
deviation σ, which in most cases is set to 10 ms [19].
• Number of packets in all the input flow is 2000.
• The threshold was decided at a 99% confidence interval.
5.3.1 Effects of Watermark Length and Quantization
Step-Size
This test studies the effects of varying the parameters that our scheme has
control over – the watermark length N and the quantization step-size ∆. We
compared the results of 5000 marked flows to 5000 unmarked flows, with the
parameters set as follows:
Parameter Value
N {10, 30, 50}
Pd 0.01
σ( ms) 10
∆( ms) {20, 60, 100}
Test Size 5000
The results of these experiments are given in Table 5.1 and 5.2. These
experiments show that increasing the watermark length and quantization
step-size can improve the decoder’s detection rate. It was difficult to find a
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pattern in the false positives, given that they were sensitive to the thresh-
old. When the quantization step-size is the lowest (∆ = 20 ms), the true
positive instead decreases with increasing watermark length, because at that
watermark length, there is no difference between flows with or without the
watermark, as seen in Figure 5.5(g), (d), and (a).
Table 5.1: False positive rates of tests with varying parameters for a threshold
set to have less than 1% false positives.
PPPPPPPPPN
∆ (ms)
100 60 20
50 0.0076 0.0078 0.0066
30 0.0078 0.0076 0.0094
10 0.0006 0.0090 0.0078
Table 5.2: True positives rates of tests with varying parameters for a thresh-
old set to have less than 1% false positives.
PPPPPPPPPN
∆ (ms)
100 60 20
50 1 0.9990 0.0272
30 0.9970 0.9790 0.0310
10 0.6224 0.6050 0.0310
Figure 5.5(a)– (i) gives a better analysis of the effects of varying the wa-
termark length and step-size. The dotted histogram shows the correlation
values for the false alarm cases, i.e. the flows that did not have a watermark.
The solid histogram indicates the correlation values for the 5000 watermarked
flows. Increasing the step-size decreases the average of the correlation for the
false alarms while increasing the average correlation for the true cases, thus
allowing for a clearer distinction between the two cases. Increasing the water-
mark length helps decrease the average correlations and variance of the false
positives, although the average of the true cases remains about constant.
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For the case of N = 50 and ∆ = 100 ms our scheme was successfully
able to recover nearly all the watermarks from the 5000 marked network
flows while maintaining low false positives. Therefore, for all the tests for
robustness against network jitters and packet losses, we will use N = 50 and
∆ = 100 ms as the parameters of our scheme.
5.3.2 Robustness against Network Jitters
The results in Table 5.3 show the effects of the network jitters on the detection
of the watermark by varying the standard deviation of the jitters and setting
constant all other parameters as follows:
Parameter Value
σN(ms) {10, 20, 30, 40}
Pd 0.01
N 50
∆ ms 100
Test Size 1000
The results show that our watermarking scheme is robust up to a jitter
deviation of 20 ms by achieving detection rates of over 98%. For higher jitter
standard deviation, the detection reduces as expected.
Table 5.3: True positive (TP) watermark detection rates for a Laplacian
modeled network jitter with varying standard deviation (S.D.).
Standard Deviation (ms) 10 20 30 40
TP 1.000 0.989 0.770 0.232
5.3.3 Robustness against Packet Losses
One of the novelties of this scheme is that it also considers the possibility
of packet drops. To understand the effects of deletions on our detection
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(b) N = 50,∆ = 60 ms
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
12
00
14
00
N
 =
50
Delta =50
(c) N = 50,∆ = 100 ms
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(d) N = 30,∆ = 20 ms
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(f) N = 30,∆ = 100 ms
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(g) N = 10,∆ = 20 ms
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(h) N = 10,∆ = 60 ms
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(i) N = 10,∆ = 100 ms
Figure 5.5: A histogram of the correlations between the extracted watermark
wˆ and w of 5000 marked flows (solid curve) and 5000 unmarked flows (dotted
curve).
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probabilities, we evaluated our scheme when there were packet drops with
probability of deletion Pd = {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.1} (Table 5.4) with the other
parameters remaining constant and set as follows:
Parameter Value
N 50
σN(ms) 10
∆ ms 100
Test Size 1000
The results show the effectiveness our scheme even against packet drops.
In Table 5.4, we see that the detector achieves rather high true positive rates,
even when up to 10% of packets were deleted while maintaining false positives
under 1%. Further tests show that the true positive rate would drop to 59%
when the packet deletion ratio is at 20%, which is a rare occurrence in a
network system. Hence, unlike other IPD-based designs which suffer from
desynchronization, our scheme is robust against both network jitters and
packet losses.
Table 5.4: True positive (TP) watermark detection rates for various deletion
ratios Pd. All false positive (FP) rates are restricted under 1%.
Pd 1% 2% 3% 10%
TP 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995
5.4 Watermark Visibility
It is important that when a watermark is placed, the resultant flow should be
as similar to the original flow as possible. If the watermarked flow differs from
the original, then an attacker will know that the flows are being watermarked
and attempt to remove the watermark or discard the flows.
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In this section, to examine the visibility of our scheme; we perform two
experiments using well-known techniques capable of detecting the presence
of a watermark: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and multi-flow attack. We
test the visibility using simulated flows with rates λ = 3.3 pps.
5.4.1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was explained in Section 3.2. We performed
the K-S test on simulated networks flows, comparing 1000 watermarked
flows against 1000 unwatermarked flows. The results in Table 5.5 give
the dK statistic for varying watermark length N = {30, 40, 50} and ∆ =
{60, 80, 100}ms. These results show that our watermark stays invisible
within 99% confidence intervals corresponding to K-S distances below 0.036,
a reference threshold suggested in [38].
Table 5.5: Average K-S distances for varying watermark lengths and step-
sizes.
PPPPPPPPPN
∆ (ms)
100 80 60
30 0.0177 0.0138 0.0101
40 0.0233 0.0181 0.0133
50 0.0284 0.0223 0.0160
5.4.2 Multi-Flow Attack
We tested the visibility of our scheme against the multi-flow attack to check
if our quantization step-size causes visible empty intervals. The multi-flow
attack was shown to be weak against watermarks located at multiple posi-
tions [3]. For this test though, we used the same marker m for all the 10
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Figure 5.6: Histogram of empty intervals in an aggregate of 10 flows
aggregated flows, and the marker was located in the same position (a dis-
advantageous setup for our scheme). The embedding parameters used were
N = 50, n = 10 and ∆ = 100 ms.
Testing against simulated traffic at the rate of λ = 3.3 pps, the histogram
of empty intervals in the aggregated flow is depicted in Figure 5.6. Compared
to the unmarked flows, no clear abnormal number of empty interval patterns
are observed in the marked flows. The exact statistics of empty intervals for
the two cases are given in Table 5.6, which gives the average of the number
of empty intervals in the 500 packets that contain the watermark for 10 sets
of aggregated flows.
Our scheme remains invisible to the multi-flow attack since, in spite of
modifying the IPDs, these modifications are flow dependent, i.e. the modified
IPD is always dependent on the existing IPDs. Therefore, different flows will
use different IPDs to embed the same watermark.
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Table 5.6: Average number of empty intervals over the first 500 packets for
watermarked and unwatermarked flows.
Marked Unmarked
Mean 24.07 25.96
Standard Deviation 5.246 5.187
5.5 Conclusion
An invisible flow watermarking scheme is presented for network forensic ap-
plication. This scheme is identified as:
• Robust to network jitters
• Robust to network packet drops
• Undetectable to schemes such as the K-S test and multi-flow attack.
Experimental results verified the first two points, that the embedded wa-
termark can be retrieved with high probability in presence of both network
jitters and high rate of packet drop. Moreover, we verified the transparency
of the scheme against the K-S test and the multi-flow attack.
This scheme can later be extended to include the possibility of insertions
that are also present in the network. We will also, in addition to simulated
traffic, use real time SSH traffic to show that our watermarking scheme is
effective at tracing network flows.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
With the rapid growth of technology, more data is being stored on the net-
work and more systems are connecting to it. There is an increasing awareness
about the importance of data security and integrity. Covert communication
channels enable the transmission of data without anyone’s knowledge except
the intended receiver. The timing channel has been studied as a means to
covertly encrypt data within the IPDs of the network flow by modifying the
timings of successive packets.
In this thesis, we proposed two novel designs that, by the means of the
timing channel, embed some information within the network flows; we were
able to achieve the following:
• Relay spied data using a spyware which when triggered, injects the
data within the IPDs of the network flow by using a coding scheme
that is robust to the noise introduced by the CSMA/CA protocol. This
coding scheme is based on the low-density parity-check codes coupled
with shaping and dithering, followed by a decoding strategy on the
graphical structure formed by the queuing channel and the encoding
scheme. We demonstrated the data is decodable in spite of the back-
off rule of the CSMA/CA protocol. We have verified the transparency
of the spyware circuitry and the injected data against covert channel
methodologies.
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• Link network flows belonging to the same chain by injecting a wa-
termark within the IPDs of the network flow. The watermark can
withstand both deletion and substitution errors caused by the network
jitters and packet drops by using the maximum likelihood and forward-
backward algorithm on the hidden Markov model of the channel with
dependent deletion and substitution errors. We demonstrated that in
spite of the jitters and packet drops, we were able to reliably detect
the watermark, which remained undetectable to well-known detection
techniques that attempt to identify and remove the watermarked flows.
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APPENDIX A
INFORMATION THEORY CONCEPTS
This chapter presents some of the information theory concepts and formulas
needed for this thesis as given by [65].
Entropy is a logarithmic function of the probability of a random variable.
It denotes the average uncertainty and the average number of bits required
to encode a random variable
The entropy of a random variable X with probability mass function p(x)
is given by (using base 2)
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log2 p(x) (A.1)
The entropy is always positive or zero, and is maximized by a uniform dis-
tribution.
For a pair of random variables (X, Y ) with joint probability distribution
p(x, y), the joint entropy H(X, Y ) is given by
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y) log2 p(x, y) (A.2)
by the chain rule we can get the conditional entropy,
H(X|Y ) = H(X, Y )−H(X) (A.3)
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The entropy rate of a stochastic process Xi is defined by
H(X ) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(X1, X2, X3, . . . , Xn) (A.4)
Mutual Information is the amount of information one random variable
contains about the other. For random variables X and Y with probability
mass funciton p(x) and p(y), respectively, the mutual information is given
by
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y )
(A.5)
Capacity of a channel is the maximum rate at which information can be
sent over the channel for it to be decoded with near zero probability of error.
It is the maximum over the mutual information between the input and the
output.
For a channel with input X and output Y , the capacity is given by:
C = max
p(x)
I(X;Y ) (A.6)
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APPENDIX B
HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL AND
FORWARD-BACKWARD ALGORITHM
A hidden Markov model (HMM) is a Markov model where the output of each
state is visible, but the underlining state itself is not. For example, tossing
a fair and unfair coin, where the we do not know which coin is being tossed,
but we see the series of ‘heads’ and ‘tails’.
Consider an HMM with states si where i ∈ [1,M ] with an output at each
state i being oi. By the properties of a Markov process,
P (si+1|s1, . . . , si) = P (si+1|si)
Two important definitions used on the HMM are the forward probability
(Fi(k)) and the backward probability (Bi(k)) which are given by
Fi(k) = P (o1, . . . , oi|si = k)
=
M∑
j=1
Fi−1(j)P (oi, si = k|si−1 = j)
Bi(k) = P (oi+1, . . . , oM |si = k)
=
M∑
j=1
Bi+1(j)P (oi+1, si+1 = j|si = k)
Using the above definitions, we can calculate the following
P (si = k, si+1 = j|o1, . . . , oM) = Fi(k)P (oi+1, si+1 = j|si = k)Bi+1(j)
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APPENDIX C
DERIVATIONS
C.1 Shaping
Shaping or the inverse transformation technique allows us to generate a ran-
dom variable with the desired distribution from a uniformly distributed ran-
dom variable by taking the required distribution inverse cumulative distri-
bution on the uniform random variable. If two random variables have the
same cumulative distribution, then their probability distributions are also
the same.
Claim 1. A uniformly distributed random variable U on [0, 1] can be mapped
to a random variable X with the desired distribution having an invertible non-
decreasing cumulative distribution FX(x) by
X = F−1X (U) (C.1)
Proof.
P (X <= x) = P (F−1X (U) <= x) (given in equation (C.1))
= P (U <= FX(x)) (F is an increasing function)
= FX(x)
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C.2 Little’s Law
Little’s law states that the average number of customers in a queuing system
is equal to the average arrival rate of customers to that system, times the
mean time of customers in that system [66].
Claim 2. According to Little’s law, the average waiting time (W ) for a queu-
ing channel with rate µ and average arrival rate λ where λ < µ is given by
E[W ] =
1
(µ− λ) (C.2)
From Little’s law we can say that:
E[N ] = λE[W ] (C.3)
where E[N ], λ and E[W ] represent the average number of customers, average
arrival rate and average time spent (waiting) in the system, respectively. Let
N be the number of customers in the server, and set pii be the probability of
i customers. Then for λ < µ, the steady state solution is
λpii−1 = µpii
where pii , P (N = i)
(C.4)
Let us define
ρ =
λ
µ
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Then we can rewrite equation (C.4) as
pii = ρpii−1
pii = ρ
ipi0
pii = ρ
i(1− ρ)
Therefore,
E[N ] =
i=∞∑
i=0
ipii
=
i=∞∑
i=0
i(1− ρ)ρi
= (1− ρ)
i=∞∑
i=0
iρi
= (1− ρ) ρ
(1− ρ)2
=
ρ
(1− ρ)
Substituting the above in equation (C.3) we have
E[N ] = λE[W ]
E[W ] =
1
λ
E[N ]
=
1
λ
ρ
(1− ρ)
=
1
λ
λ
µ
(1− λ
µ
)
E[W ] =
1
(µ− λ)
81
REFERENCES
[1] B. W. Lampson, “A note on the confinement problem,” Commun.
ACM, vol. 16, pp. 613–615, October 1973. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/362375.362389
[2] R. A. Kemmerer, “Shared resource matrix methodology: An
approach to identifying storage and timing channels,” ACM Trans.
Comput. Syst., vol. 1, pp. 256–277, August 1983. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/357369.357374
[3] N. Kiyavash, A. Houmansadr, and N. Borisov, “Multi-flow attacks
against network flow watermarking schemes,” in USENIX Security Sym-
posium, 2008, pp. 307–320.
[4] “Trusted computer system evaluation,” U.S. Department of Defense,
Tech. Rep. DOD 5200.28-STD, 1985.
[5] A. Wagner and V. Anantharam, “Information theory of covert timing
channels,” in NATO/ASI Workshop on Network Security and Intrusion
Detection, 2005.
[6] M. H. Kang, I. S. Moskowitz, D. C. Lee, M. Ieee, and M. Ieee, “A
network pump,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 22,
pp. 329–338, 1996.
[7] V. Anantharam and S. Verdu, “Reflections on the 1998 information
theory society paper award: Bits through queues,” IEEE Information
Theory Society Newsletter, pp. 100–102, December 1999.
[8] S. Servetto and M. Vetterli, “Communication using phantom covert
channels in the internet,” in IEEE International Symposium on Infor-
mation Theory, 2004, p. 229.
[9] X. Luo, E. W. Chan, and R. K. C. Chang, “Covert communications in
TCP burstiness,” Hong Kong Polytechnic University, preprint, 2007.
[10] V. Anantharam and S. Verdu, “Bits through queues,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 4 –18, January 1996.
82
[11] A. Bedekar and M. Azizoglu, “The information-theoretic capacity
of discrete-time queues,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 446 –461, mar 1998.
[12] R. Sundaresan and S. Verdu, “Sequential decoding for the exponen-
tial server timing channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 705 –709, March 2000.
[13] M. A. Padlipsky, D. W. Snow, and P. A. Karger, “Limitations of end-to-
end encryption in secure computer networks,” Hanscom Air Force Base,
MA, August 1978.
[14] S. Cabuk, C. Brodley, and C. Shields, “IP covert timing channels: De-
sign and detection,” in ACM conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security (CCS), 2004, pp. 178–187.
[15] S. Staniford-Chen and L. T. Heberlein, “Holding intruders accountable
on the internet,” in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 39–
49.
[16] Y. Zhang and V. Paxson, “Detecting stepping stones,” in USENIX Se-
curity Symposium, 2000, pp. 171–184.
[17] X. Wang and D. S. Reeves, “Robust correlation of encrypted attack
traffic through stepping stones by manipulation of interpacket delays,”
in ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2003,
pp. 20–29.
[18] Y. J. Pyun, Y. H. Park, X. Wang, D. S. Reeves, and P. Ning, “Tracing
traffic through intermediate hosts that repacketize flows,” in Infocom,
2007, pp. 634–642.
[19] A. Houmansadr, N. Kiyavash, and N. Borisov, “Rainbow: A robust
and invisible non-blind watermark for network flows,” in Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium, 2009.
[20] K. Yoda and H. Etoh, “Finding a connection chain for tracing intruders,”
in Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 191–205.
[21] X. Wang, D. S. Reeves, and S. F. Wu, “Inter-packet delay based cor-
relation for tracing encrypted connections through stepping stones,” in
Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security, ser. ESORICS ’02. London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2002,
pp. 244–263.
83
[22] X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia, “Tracking anonymous peer-
to-peer VoIP calls on the internet,” in Proceedings of the 12th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, ser.
CCS ’05. New York, NY: ACM, 2005. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1102120.1102133 pp. 81–91.
[23] X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia, “Network flow watermarking attack
on low-latency anonymous communication systems,” in IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy, 2007.
[24] M. Kang and I. Moskowitz, “A pump for rapid, reliable, secure communi-
cation,” in ACM conference on Computer and communications security
(CCS), 1993, pp. 119–129.
[25] J. Giles and B. Hajek, “An information-theoretic and game-theoretic
study of timing channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 48, no. 9, pp. 2455–2477, 2002.
[26] M. Kang, I. Moskowitz, and D. Lee, “A network version of the pump,”
in Security and Privacy, 1995. Proceedings., 1995 IEEE Symposium on,
may 1995, pp. 144–154.
[27] V. Berk, A. Giani, and G. Cybenko, “Detection of covert channel encod-
ing in network packet delays,” Dartmouth College, Dept of Computer
Science Tech. Rep. TR2005536, 2005.
[28] S. Gianvecchio and H. Wang, “Detecting covert timing channels:
an entropy-based approach,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM
conference on Computer and communications security, ser. CCS
’07. New York, NY: ACM, 2007. [Online]. Available: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/1315245.1315284 pp. 307–316.
[29] P. Peng, P. Ning, and D. Reeves, “On the secrecy of timing-based ac-
tive watermarking trace-back techniques,” in Security and Privacy, 2006
IEEE Symposium on, may 2006, pp. 15 pp. –349.
[30] A. Kolmogorov, “Sulla determinazione empirica di una legge di dis-
tribuzione,” Giornale dell’ Istituto Italiano degli Attuari, vol. 4, pp.
83–91, 1933.
[31] N. Smirnov, “Sur les e´carts de la courbe de distribution empirique,”
Recueil Mathe´matique (Matematiceskii Sbornik), N.S., vol. 6, pp. 3–26,
1939.
[32] “Defense Science Board (DSB) study on high performance microchip
supply,” 2005, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS\
Report\ Final.pdf.
84
[33] D. Agrawal, S. Baktir, D. Karakoyunlu, P. Rohatgi, and B. Sunar, “Tro-
jan detection using IC fingerprinting,” in IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 2007, pp. 296–310.
[34] Y. Alkabani and F. Koushanfar, “Active hardware metering for intellec-
tual property protection and security,” in USENIX Security, 2007, pp.
291–306.
[35] S. Adee, “The hunt for the kill switch,” May 2008, http://www.
spectrum.ieee.org/may08/6171.
[36] S. King, J. Tucek, A. Cozzie, C. Grier, W. Jiang, and Y. Zhou., “De-
signing and implementing malicious hardware,” in USENIX Workshop
on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (LEET), 2008.
[37] B. Prabhakar and R. Gallager, “Entropy and the timing capacity of
discrete queues,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 49,
no. 2, pp. 357 –370, February 2003.
[38] F. J. Massey Jr, “The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for goodness of fit,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 46, no. 253, pp.
68–78, 1951.
[39] S. Cabuk, “Network covert channels: Design, analysis, detection, and
elimination,” Tech. Rep., 2006.
[40] G. Shah, A. Molina, and M. Blaze, “Keyboards and covert channels,”
in Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium -
Volume 15, ser. USENIX-SS’06. Berkeley, CA: USENIX Association,
2006. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1267336.
1267341
[41] W. Yu, X. Fu, S. Graham, D. Xuan, and W. Zhao, “DSSS-based
flow marking technique for invisible traceback,” in Proceedings of
the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, ser. SP ’07.
Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society, 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2007.14 pp. 18–32.
[42] R. G. Gallager, “Low density parity check codes,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960.
[43] T. J. Richardson, M. A. Shokrollahi, and R. L. Urbanke, “Design of
capacity-approaching irregular low-density parity-check codes,” IEEE
Transactions Information Theory, vol. 47, pp. 619–637, 2001.
[44] R. Gallager, “Low-density parity-check codes,” Information Theory,
IRE Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 21 –28, January 1962.
85
[45] D. J. MacKay and R. M. Neal, “Near Shannon limit performance of low
density parity check codes,” Electronics Letters, vol. 32, pp. 1645–1646,
1996.
[46] D. MacKay, “Good error-correcting codes based on very sparse matri-
ces,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 399
–431, March 1999.
[47] F. Kschischang, B. Frey, and H.-A. Loeliger, “Factor graphs and the
sum-product algorithm,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 498 –519, February 2001.
[48] G. Forney, “Codes on graphs: Normal realizations,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 520–548, 2001.
[49] T. Coleman and N. Kiyavash, “Sparse graph codes and practical de-
coding algorithms for communicating over packet timings in networks,”
Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (2008), pp. 447–452,
2008.
[50] R. G. Gallager, Information Theory and Reliable Communication. New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968.
[51] A. Bennatan and D. Burshtein, “Design and analysis of nonbinary LDPC
codes for arbitrary discrete-memoryless channels,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 549–583, 2006.
[52] J. Ziv, “On universal quantization,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 344–347, 1985.
[53] B. Chen and G. W. Wornell, “Quantization index modulation: A class
of provably good methods for digital watermarking and information em-
bedding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 47, pp. 1423–
1443, 2001.
[54] U. Erez and R. Zamir, “Achieving 1/2 log (1+SNR) on the AWGN
channel with lattice encoding and decoding,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 50, no. 10, pp. 2293 – 2314, oct. 2004.
[55] G. D. F. Jr., “On the role of MMSE estimation in approaching the
information-theoretic limits of linear Gaussian channels: Shannon meets
Wiener,” CoRR, vol. arXiv:cs.IT/0409053, 2004.
[56] N. Kiyavash, T. Coleman, and M. Rodrigues, “Novel shaping and
complexity-reduction techniques for approaching capacity over queuing
timing channels,” in Communications, 2009. ICC ’09. IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on, June 2009, pp. 1 –5.
86
[57] “IEEE 802.11 LAN/MAN Wireless LANS Standard,” 2007, http:
//standards.ieee.org/getieee802/802.11.html.
[58] “WARP: Wireless Open-Access Research Platform,” 2008, http://
warp.rice.edu/trac/.
[59] R. Sundaresan and S. Verdu, “Robust decoding for timing channels,”
IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 405–419, 2000.
[60] T. Richardson and R. Urbanke, Modern Coding Theory. New York,
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[61] A. Tartakovsky and V. Veeravalli, “Asymptotic analysis of Bayesian
quickest change detection procedures,” IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory, 2002.
[62] A. Tartakovsky, B. Rozovskii, R. Blazˇek, and H. Kim, “Detection of
intrusions in information systems by sequential change-point methods,”
Statistical Methodology, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 252–293, 2006.
[63] W. Ding and S.-H. Huang, “Detecting intruders using a long connection
chain to connect to a host,” in Advanced Information Networking and
Applications (AINA), 2011 IEEE International Conference on, march
2011, pp. 121 –128.
[64] M. C. Davey and D. J. C. Mackay, “Reliable communication over chan-
nels with insertions, deletions, and substitutions,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 47, pp. 687 – 698, 2001.
[65] T. M. Cover and J. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed.
New York: Wiley, 1991.
[66] L. Kleinrock, Theory, Volume 1, Queueing Systems. Wiley-Interscience,
NY, 1975.
87
